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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the factors, related to urban stadium development, that act as a 
catalyst for subsequent local urban renewal. Over the recent decades there has been 
substantial debate related to stadium or arena development. “The stadium debate 
intersects with cultural studies, economics, law, urban studies, civic planning, sports 
administration, mass communications, and sociology.”1 The center of this debate is over 
the economic and social “net benefit” to a city that undertakes a stadium development.  
 
Many argue that the economic and social costs created by urban stadium development 
outweigh the public good, especially in the case of publicly funded or subsidized 
stadiums. This thesis concentrates on the renewal of the surrounding real estate markets 
rather than broader economic renewal. When this thesis refers to “urban renewal” it is 
meant in the context of the renewal of the physical infrastructure and real property.  
 
The thesis examines the range of costs and benefits resulting from stadium induced urban 
real estate renewal. The benefits analyzed are derived from the changes in the local real 
estate markets that may be connected to the arena or stadium construction. The subject 
case study illustrates some of the broader economic benefits related to urban real estate 
renewal. 
 
Washington, DC provides a recent example of urban arena development that led to 
significant local investment in the development of the surrounding area. Construction of 
the Verizon Center led to development of residential, office, and retail product in the 
immediate area. The case study explores the factors (specific to the site, team owners, 
local developers, and city officials) that create a fertile environment for urban real estate 
renewal. It also ascertains, by way of interviews and public record, the concerns of these 
parties while making the critical decisions that can spark this type of urban rebirth. Using 
the Verizon Center case study, this thesis examines the factors that had a positive impact 
on urban renewal.  
 
Thesis Supervisor:  John F. Kennedy 
Title:  Lecturer
                                                 
1 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Many American citizens have had the experience of attending a professional sporting 
event in a stadium or arena. It is hard to forget the masses converging on the often-
colossal stadium, arena or ballpark. The approach to the venue is a swirl of patrons from 
different backgrounds, merchandising and retail peddlers, the patrons of the bars 
surrounding the stadium, and the fumes of the local food vendors and the restaurants. 
Attendees come from all areas of the region, emerging from the parking lots, buses and 
trains that empty into the immediate stadium neighborhood. Standing in the shadow of a 
professional sports facility, just prior to game time, leaves little doubt of the broad draw 
and community vitality they effectuate.  
 
Over the course of the twentieth century, professional sports have emerged as big 
business; capable of substantial profits through a broad range of operations and media 
endeavors. Sports franchises (and the facilities that house them) have gained significant 
prominence over the past two decades. The amount of money generated through 
professional sports has created an environment of league expansion in recent years. This 
profitability paired with increasing media coverage has made these franchises an asset to 
their host cities. A professional franchise can stimulate a city’s national prominence and 
can create a distinct identity for the city and its greater region. The development of a new 
stadium or arena can set the tempo for the success of a professional sports franchise. 
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Simultaneous with the growth of the professional sport industry has been a commercial 
real estate trend towards the revitalization of downtrodden urban centers – creating even 
greater opportunities for downtown entertainment and sports facilities.  
 
Sports venues as destinations have proliferated in recent years in response 
to a number of factors. In some cases, such as Baltimore’s Camden Yards, 
Denver’s Coors Field, and the MCI Center, sports venues have been part 
of municipal planners’ efforts to revitalize the downtown district. When 
new sports venues are built, complimentary businesses, including 
restaurants and retail, are often drawn to the area to take advantage of the 
large gameday crowds. In otherwise blighted areas, such an influx of 
additional amenities and businesses can spur construction and renovation, 
job creation, and increased tax revenue. 2 
 
Accordingly, “stadium construction has moved forward at an unprecedented rate over the 
past 20 years.”3 Development of these stadiums and arenas can do much to define a city’s 
local and national image. And, in most cases, the venue itself can help to bolster team 
revenues. Furthermore, in certain cases, urban stadium development can act as a catalyst 
for the revitalization of the surrounding neighborhoods. “Major development projects 
contribute to economic growth in three ways. First, they stimulate direct spending. 
Stadium boosters argue that the direct revenues emanating from stadium construction and 
operation exceed the costs of stadium construction and maintenance. Second, there are 
indirect benefits and there is a multiplier effect. Advocates of stadiums maintain that 
                                                 
2 Beyard, Michael D. et al. (2001) Developing Retail Entertainment Destinations. Second Edition. (First 
Edition Title: Developing Urban Retail Centers) Washington, D.C.: ULI – the Urban Land Institute. p 25. 
3 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
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these produce revenues that exceed construction costs. Finally, the cluster of activity and 
innovation associated with a new development project gives a city the reputation of a 
vibrant and reliable place to do business.”4  
 
As these stadiums and arenas are planned and constructed, real estate developers, often in 
partnership with the host city, follow suit and look to invest in residential, cultural, and 
commercial development in the neighborhoods immediately surrounding the proposed 
venues. Thus, stadiums can provide a catalytic effect to real estate development in the 
area surrounding the stadium. As a result, American cities have sought to lure these 
franchises (and the prospects for a new stadium) in hopes for broader national recognition 
and some level of local urban activation and renewal.  
 
However, due to the significant price tag associated with constructing the venues there is 
an ever-growing debate over how beneficial these arenas ultimately are for the 
communities they impact. As Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist point out, this debate 
focuses on two core questions: (i) who is responsible for the financing of a stadium? and 
(ii) how will the stadium effect aggregate economic welfare? “Typically, the debate over 
stadium economics focuses on job and income creation in the community in which the 
facility is built, but the range of economic effects is far broader: it encompasses regional 
and national wealth, as well as the welfare of sports fans and the distribution of income.”5 
 
                                                 
4 Euchner, Charles C. (1994) Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them.  
Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press. p 65. 
5 Noll, Roger G, and Zimbalist, Andrew, Editors (1997) Sport, Jobs and Taxes.  Washington:  Brookings 
Press. p 6. 
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Housing a professional sports franchise can be a “net benefit” for a city, although it is 
difficult to precisely, quantitatively define or project this benefit.  There is no magic 
bullet stadium solution that leads to broad economic and urban renewal. Even stadiums 
that prove to be successful cannot be credited to a simple eloquent equation or recipe. 
The successful cases often involve an element of good timing and always require 
cooperation between the public and private interests. As with all large-scale 
developments, there is simply no way to solve all problems or to please everyone in the 
community. Thus, cities should not seek to develop a stadium simply as a panacea for 
any lagging economic or social circumstances.  
 
Due to the availability of data spanning its ten-year existence, the Verizon Center in 
Washington, DC will be the central case study in this document. The Verizon Center 
(formerly the MCI center) was completed in 1997 and is home to the Wizards NBA 
franchise and the Capitals NHL franchise. The Wizards and Capitals, although 
Washington teams, were previously housed in an arena in nearby Landover, MD. The 
thesis will explore how the Verizon Center came to be and the effect it has had on the 
subsequent development patterns of its surroundings in Downtown Washington, DC.  
 
The Verizon Center is located in Washington’s East End and there can be no denying the 
explosive growth of this submarket over the past ten years. The area has transformed 
from a beat up, urban carcass, left for dead after the riots of 1968, to a thriving downtown 
business district with a solid balance of office, residential, retail, arts and entertainment 
product. It is a unique Washington, DC submarket, which many consider similar to the 
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vibrant urban environment of New York City. This thesis investigates the emergence of 
the East End and what impact the presence of the Verizon Center has had on the 
development of the broader submarket. The thesis will also look into the dynamic forces 
that came together to facilitate, not only the success of the arena itself, but also the 
success of the greater Downtown DC revitalization.  
 
In order to properly understand the place of a stadium, arena or ballpark in the urban 
fabric of contemporary America one must consider the role of stadiums throughout 
history. This requires exploration all the way back to the development of stadiums in 
ancient Greece and Rome. It was there that the standard design and construction methods 
of stadium development took root. Even in those times stadiums played a central role in 
the everyday lives of the citizens in the cities the stadiums called home. Throughout 
history stadiums have ebbed and flowed in their role as urban landmarks and stimulants. 
The presence of athletic events waned in the first one and a half millennia AD, only to 
reemerge as a focal point of urban centers at the end of the twentieth century. 
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2.0 THE STADIUM IN HISTORY 
Sports stadiums have been at the center of cities and communities for over two thousand 
years. Over this period construction materials, architectural design, uses and operations 
have all evolved. Stadiums and arenas have gone from temporary wooden structures to 
colossal works of steel and concrete. Over the centuries stadiums have seen the rise, fall 
and rebirth of their architectural importance and their role in the community. Still 
stadiums, arenas and their derivatives have always played a substantial role in urban 
identity and recreational programming. Even in the earliest days of the stadium, citizens 
were drawn from the surrounding community to witness the games housed within. The 
role of the audience at a sporting event in Rome was somewhat similar to that of the 
audience at today’s events. The nature of the interaction between the citizens, the 
stadiums, and the contests that took place within these venues has remained largely 
consistent over time.6 Despite the variety of common characteristics between the 
stadiums of old and their contemporary cousins, stadiums and arenas did not become 
commercial entities until recently.7 
 
Stadiums represent some of the most historic architectural structures on earth. Perhaps 
the best-known historic example is the Roman Coliseum (AD 82). “The Flavian 
Amphitheatre in Rome, better known as the Coliseum from the eighth century onwards, 
is the greatest exemplar of this building type and has seldom been surpassed to this day as 
                                                 
6 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
7 Ibid 
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a rational fusion of engineering, theatre and art.”8 Still, stadiums and their predecessors 
existed centuries before the Coliseum was constructed. And, in a parallel to contemporary 
stadium debates, historians dispute whether the development of the ancient stadiums 
represented a burden or a benefit to the lower classes. 
 
2.1 GREECE 
The Greeks provided the prototypes for modern sports venues. The Greek’s stadia and 
hippodromes were home to Olympic and other events as early as 800 B.C. “The civic 
importance of such sporting facilities in Greek life is demonstrated particularly well at 
the ancient city of Olympia…at the height of its development, (it) was a rendezvous for 
the whole Greek world.”9 Olympia was home to a mixed-use complex of temples for 
deities and sporting venues. Clearly this ancient real estate development was a huge 
engine for the city of Olympia. The use of the Olympian site was very similar to the 
multi-use arenas we see in contemporary urban centers.  
 
Modern stadium design is derived from the early Greek forms. In fact, according to 
David Romano, the Panathenaic Stadium in Athens (constructed 200 B.C.) was re-used in 
conjunction with the 1896 and 2004 Olympic Games.10  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Geraint, John, and Sheard, Rod and Vickery, Ben (2007) Stadia: A Design and Development Guide. 
Burlington: Architectural Press. 
9 Ibid 
10 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
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2.2 ROME 
The Romans adopted and continued the Greek tradition, and introduced the development 
of stadiums on a much larger scale from 300 BC to AD 400. Their arenas and stadiums 
were home to sporting contests; however the Romans primarily used these venues for 
combat events such as the infamous battles of the gladiators. The Romans put a particular 
emphasis on “entertainment and spectatorship” in their sport.11 Facilities, such as the 
Coliseum, could offer members of the community from all walks of life an opportunity to 
take in these events. The Coliseum was a large four-story ellipse with a tapered elevation 
of seating similar to that of contemporary stadiums. At 48,000, its capacity would not be 
surpassed by any other facility until the twentieth century.12  
 
The city of Rome was the center of a vast empire and it can be argued that the Coliseum 
was the focal point of the city. Its proximity to the center of Rome is evident in the figure 
below (the ellipse just southeast of center). 
                                                 
11 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
12 Geraint, John, and Sheard, Rod and Vickery, Ben (2007) Stadia: A Design and Development Guide. 
Burlington: Architectural Press. 
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Figure 1 – Downtown Rome 
“As Christianity swept through Europe the emphasis of society shifted to religious 
salvation, and architectural effort was turned to the building of churches rather than 
places of recreation and entertainment.”13 For the most part, there were no significant 
new stadiums developed for the next fifteen hundred years. “Rome’s secular model of 
sport and the evolution of stadium construction from temporary wooden facilities to 
grandiose permanent structures parallels the development of sport in America.”14 Indeed, 
stadium development around the globe was relatively stagnant until the Industrial 
Revolution of the 19th century brought with it a stadium renaissance in the New World.  
                                                 
13 Geraint, John, and Sheard, Rod and Vickery, Ben (2007) Stadia: A Design and Development Guide. 
Burlington: Architectural Press. 
14 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
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2.3 AMERICA AND THE REBIRTH OF THE STADIUM  
The Industrial Revolution was catalyst to an increase in population density in the cities of 
the United States. It also represented a time of extreme immigration, which further 
populated the urban centers of the east coast and other major cities. From 1860 to 1914, 
the population of New York City grew from 850,000 to 4 million, the population of 
Chicago grew from 110,000 to 2 million, and the Philadelphia population grew from 
650,000 to 1.5 million.15 At the same time steel was being used more frequently for 
construction and engineering practices. Annual steel production in the United States 
increased from one million tons in 1880 to twenty five million tons in 1910.16 The 
Industrial Revolution was also a period of labor exploitation. This exploitation facilitated 
large-scale construction. Add this all up and you had a recipe for urban stadium and arena 
development. Accordingly, the end of the nineteenth century ushered in a period of 
widespread, innovative stadium development in American cities.  
 
The British athletic tradition up to the twentieth century focused on amateur sports. 
America followed this tradition through most of its early history. In America, college 
football was the preeminent athletic spectator draw of the 19th and early 20th centuries.  
Professional sporting events did not begin to become popular in America until the 
emergence of professional baseball in the late nineteenth century. In 1869 the Cincinnati 
Red Stockings became the first American “professional” sports franchise. Prior to 1869 
baseball was played at the highest level by a handful of local club teams that fielded their 
                                                 
15 Zinn, Howard (1997) A People’s History of the United States. New York: The New Press. 
16 Ibid 
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rosters with local talent. The Red Stockings were the first team to recruit nationally and 
thus lure players away from other markets by way of salary incentives. This national 
outreach led the Red Stockings to a 56-0-1 record for the 1869 season. As a result of their 
astounding success, the Red Stockings were the first baseball team to garner national 
prominence. The cities and towns that hosted the rival teams saw the amount of national 
attention the Red Stockings had brought to Cincinnati and wanted their piece. Suddenly 
there was a move by many baseball teams to attract as much talent as possible in hopes of 
replicating the success of the Red Stockings. Hence, baseball became America’s first 
professional athletic league.  
 
“Civic pride influenced the attempt to corral the finest athletes, and civic pride later led to 
more ornate ballpark construction.”17 The increased interest in professional sports and the 
technological advancement of the Industrial Revolution propelled the development of 
more advanced construction practices than the wood frame designed venues of the past. 
“As Americans displayed a great willingness to pay admission, owners contemplated the 
benefits of larger, more permanent facilities while weighing the apparent liabilities of 
wood construction.”18 This trend led to the construction of stadiums using steel and 
concrete.  
 
The industrial development also provided the cities with broader public transportation 
systems such as the trolley, which became popular at the turn of the twentieth century. 
These urban trolley systems allowed for easier public access to sporting events. The 
                                                 
17 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
18 Ibid 
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development of transportation systems such as the trolley, the train and later the bus 
allowed citizens from the relative outskirts of town to easily access the sporting events 
that often took place in the center of the city. Public transportation was just as important 
to early twentieth century American stadiums as it is today.  
 
The newly erected stadiums at the turn of the twentieth century created a draw based on 
the newly formed American interest in professional sports. However, there is no strong 
evidence that the development of these stadiums had a drastic affect on the development 
pattern of their surrounding neighborhoods during the first decades of the twentieth 
century. In order to illustrate the relationship between stadiums and their surroundings at 
the turn of the twentieth century, we must explore the trends that accompanied America’s 
two most popular sports: football and baseball. 
 
2.4 FOOTBALL STADIUM TRENDS IN THE U.S. 
Amateur sport, more specifically college football, was the focal point of the American 
spectator experience at the dawn of the twentieth century. College football teams were 
arguably the most well known sports teams in America at this time. There was no 
television broadcast of these events so, unless they were at the event, fans or enthusiasts 
could only follow the game through the newspapers or on the radio. Thus, universities 
and their stadiums had the ability to draw a large group of people from the surroundings 
area to watch a game in person. 
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As a result, schools such as the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard University were 
the forerunners of modern stadium construction. Franklin Field at the University of 
Pennsylvania was constructed in 1895. Its original construction included the use of wood 
for the bleachers and other less prominent features. Franklin Field shares many design 
features common to the stadia and arenas of ancient Greece and Rome, including its U-
shape and vast facade of structural arches. It was a distinct facility for one of the most 
followed sports teams of the day, the Quaker football squad. Franklin Field remains the 
oldest football stadium in current use. However, despite its trailblazing nature, it was not 
upgraded to its current woodless form until the1920s.  
 
 
Figure 2  – Franklin Field - 1940  
In fact, the first sports facility to be built wholly of steel and concrete was Harvard 
University’s football stadium. It was erected in 1903 and remains in use to this day. Both 
of the aforementioned stadiums were designed in manner consistent with the ancient 
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Greek and Roman forms. These stadiums were home to some of the largest football 
crowds at the turn of the twentieth century. Given the absence of professional football 
until 1920, these amateur events had the ability to draw large crowds of people from all 
walks of life. They did not, however, influence the pattern of urban development to a 
great degree in their surrounding neighborhoods. The college football stadiums of the 
early 1900s instead served as a point of pride for students, faculty and alumni. The newly 
created steel stadiums acted more as public relations vehicles for the universities than as a 
key element to the design fabric of the schools.  
 
The American Professional Football Association (APFA) was founded in 1920 and was 
the precursor for what we now know as the National Football League. In 1921 the APFA 
was changed to the American Professional Football League (APFL). Smaller towns, such 
as Canton, Ohio, hosted many of these professional football franchises. By 1934 almost 
all of the smaller-market teams had moved to the larger cities of the east coast and 
Midwest. Many of the professional football teams shared facilities with the existing 
baseball franchises of the day. Examples of such multi-use venues are New York’s Polo 
Grounds, Boston’s Fenway Park and Chicago’s Wrigley Field. Still, up until the end of 
World War II, college football remained far more popular around the country than its 
professional offspring. Then in the 1950s with the beginning of national television 
broadcasting, professional football emerged as a major American sport. Professional 
football’s league names evolved until reaching the current moniker of NFL.19 
 
                                                 
19 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
 18 
The 1960s and early 1970s saw a trend towards single use stadiums for baseball and 
football. It was also in these years that there was a growing trend toward public 
subsidization of stadium development. Much of this trend was based on the civic pride, or 
perception there of, that cities attributed to hosting major professional athletic franchises. 
The widening television market for professional sporting events fueled this marketing 
appeal. Thus cities began to pursue the development of state of the art facilities to house 
the teams, such as the construction of the Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City (1972) and 
Giants Stadium in New Jersey (1976). However, in many cases these stadiums were 
constructed outside of the city center. The stadiums were not intended to interact with 
any surrounding developments and were not planned as a part of any broad vision of 
urban renewal. These stadiums, instead, were stand alone shrines to the teams they 
housed and the cities they called home.20 
 
The 1960s and 1970s were also characterized by urban flight and the disintegration of the 
fabric of the downtown districts in many of America’s cities. Cities became less than 
desirable locations for stadium development. This circumstance combined with the sheer 
size of most football stadiums caused much of the stadium development in the decade to 
take place outside of the city centers. Football stadiums became visualized as massive 
structures surrounded by vast surface parking lots. They were in many cases entities unto 
themselves. Many stadiums - such as Washington, D.C.’s RFK Stadium (formerly D.C. 
Stadium) - although technically within city boundaries, were well outside of Downtown 
and in many ways isolated.  
                                                 
20 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
 19 
 
Despite the fact that during the 1970s professional football surpassed professional 
baseball as the country’s most popular spectator sport, the state of the economy made it 
difficult for new stadiums to be constructed in the second half of the decade.21 The 
economic situation made public subsidies largely unavailable and the teams themselves 
were unable to fund development due to broader issues within the capital markets. 
Accordingly, the early 1980s were characterized by the renovation of existing stadiums 
rather than the construction of new facilities. 
 
2.5 BASEBALL STADIUM TRENDS IN THE U.S. 
Professional baseball franchises began to move into more modern concrete and steel 
structures in the early twentieth century. In 1909 two steel and concrete baseball stadiums 
were completed in Pennsylvania. This development trend continued throughout 
professional baseball with the development or redevelopment of stadiums such as 
Chicago’s Comiskey Park (1910), New York’s Polo Grounds (renovated 1911) and 
Boston’s Fenway Park (1912).22 In the first decades of the twentieth century, professional 
baseball stadiums became more common in cities around the country. The stadiums acted 
as a hub of public entertainment and were quickly engrained in the American psyche. 
                                                 
21 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
22 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. pp 25 -27. 
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 Figure 3 – Map of Fenway Park - 1917 
At the same time, the stadiums did not greatly influence the development patterns of the 
cities that housed them. They were often located in less than central urban locales and 
often times were surrounded by industrial uses or railroad tracks. In short, the stadiums 
were developed strictly for utilitarian purposes; there was no direct intent to stimulate any 
part of the city through stadium development. The stadiums did, however, influence 
public transportation patterns. Public transportation systems were a key mode of travel 
for many of the events’ attendees. The basic stadium framework in baseball would not 
see any major changes for the following couple of decades. 
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The next major trend in baseball stadium development in America took place in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. In the early 1960s municipalities began to contribute to, or 
provide subsidies for, the development of sporting venues. Prior to this change, the 
majority of professional sports facilities were privately owned and funded.23 This 
evolution of financing occurred largely because of the national prominence that a city 
was afforded if it had its own professional franchise. At the forefront of this changing 
environment was the growing television media market related to broadcasting sporting 
events. By the late 1960s, the team owners and the cities that these teams called home 
began to fully realize the role that a stadium or arena could play in the marketing of the 
franchise and the city. These owners and city officials soon sought to build stadiums that 
not only housed the sporting events, but were also attractions in and of themselves. As 
televised sporting events proliferated, the popularity of the professional sports franchises 
grew as well. Team owners quickly moved to capture the potential revenue associated 
with broad media appeal. “Several of the cozy old Progressive Era ballparks were 
replaced in the 1960s and early 1970s by much larger facilities with the hope that these 
structures would portray a thoroughly modern image. The stadium had become a symbol 
of community pride, and taxpayer funding was expected.”24 
 
These developments in the business of professional sports also led to new trends in 
stadium construction. Three major innovations were at the center of this change: circular 
shaped stadiums, artificial turf and dome construction. The circular design was intended 
                                                 
23 Noll, Roger G, and Zimbalist, Andrew, Editors (1997) Sport, Jobs and Taxes.  Washington:  Brookings 
Press. p 2. 
24 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. p 24. 
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to facilitate television coverage although it often did not create optimal views for the live 
spectators. Dome construction allowed for indoor play and created a futuristic design 
element. It is also worth noting that this period was also marked by suburban sprawl and 
thus many stadiums were planned outside of the downtown districts. These suburban 
stadiums were built for size and were intended as city trophies rather than vehicles for 
urban growth. Attendees had to rely less on public transportation and more on automobile 
transportation to games. As a result many of the stadiums and arenas developed in the 
1960s and 1970s are vast structures rising from a sea of parking lots. The stadiums 
themselves had become civic mascots that were largely disconnected from their 
surroundings.25 
 
 No stadium better personified the stadium movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
than the Houston Astrodome, which opened to the public in 1965. The Astrodome was 
intended to become a Houston landmark and was immediately recognized for its 
futuristic design, artificial or “astro” turf field, and modern electronic scoreboard. The 
dome was the darling of the media and often received better coverage than the teams that 
it housed. The stadium, perhaps alone, caused Houston to be seen as the city of the future 
by many in the media.26 
 
The rise of these “modern” stadiums was quickly dampened by a worsening national 
economy. The mid 1970s and 1980s saw a marked decrease in the growth of both 
professional sports and the stadiums and arenas they occupied. The country was hit by an 
                                                 
25 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
26 Ibid. pp 22 – 23. 
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economic recession that brought with it interest rate levels which made any kind of 
development nearly impossible to finance. Almost no new stadium development occurred 
over these decades. In place of new development, facilities in need of changes had to 
undergo repairs and renovations. These years were characterized by increased urban 
flight and subsequent erosion of the fabric of many city centers. Professional sport 
facilities would not see any new major construction until the 1990s. 
 
2.6 1990S AND THE REBIRTH OF URBAN STADIUMS 
The 1990s represented a time of stadium rebirth in the United States. After the conclusion 
of the 1991 recession many professional sports franchises sought to reestablish team 
identities and increase team revenues. “The demand for new stadiums has also come from 
various trends within the professional sports industry: for one thing, the lack of lucrative 
luxury suites, preferential club seating, and high-revenue concourse activities has 
rendered many stadiums obsolete…Other factors include the surging popularity of 
professional basketball and hockey…and the evolution of professional sports into a true 
entertainment industry.”27 As a result many franchises have constructed new stadiums 
over the past two decades. In many cities this construction occurred within the boundaries 
of the city’s downtown districts.  
 
At the same time, team owners chose to leverage their impact on host cities by requesting 
public funding for this stadium development. In many cases these requests were accepted, 
at least to a degree. According to Robert Trumpbour, “these subsidies can take many 
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forms but are primarily the result of federal policy that allows tax-free funding of 
municipal projects.”28 The team owners argue that if developed in the proper downtown 
locale, the presence of a stadium can provide revitalization for its surrounding market. 
Accordingly, owners argue that city governments have good cause to disburse this type of 
financing due to the potential economic benefits created by a new stadium. While many 
have been skeptical of the universal benefits derived from these venues, many teams and 
cities proceeded with stadium development during the 1990s. These owners, city officials 
and developers set out to design stadiums that meshed with or complimented the urban 
fabric of the host city.  
 
A key trailblazer of this urban development trend was Baltimore, MD. The Baltimore 
Orioles abandoned their home at Memorial Stadium to locate further downtown in 
Baltimore’s Inner Harbor district. The planned stadium was to be a throwback of sorts to 
the stadiums of old. It was also intended to be a catalyst for the renewal of an underused 
area along Baltimore’s waterfront. Upon opening in 1992, the stadium succeeded as a 
sports entertainment anchor for Baltimore’s waterfront retail complex, drawing millions 
of tourists to Baltimore’s harbor on an annual basis. It was viewed by many as a 
successful example of stadium development leading to urban revitalization. In the years 
that followed, Baltimore acquired an NFL franchise and developed its stadium blocks 
away from Camden Yards. Baltimore’s urban stadium development practices were 
mirrored in many cities throughout the United States during the 1990s with mixed results. 
 
                                                 
28 Trumpbour, Robert (2007) The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
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 3.0  CONTEMPORARY STADIUM ISSUES 
The 1990s represented the beginning of the latest era of stadium development. This 
contemporary era has also been highlighted by a city trend toward the revitalization of 
blighted downtown districts. The presence of these two trends has created an 
environment where “facilities that are well integrated into an urban framework have 
substantial potential for both influencing development patterns and coupling attendance 
at a game or event with other activities.”29 Due to this confluence, among other factors, 
there has been a desire by both team owners and cities to implement stadium construction 
strategies that seek to cause revitalization in downtown districts that are not achieving 
their highest and best use. Successful realization of this potential requires the 
participation and integration of three significant groups: team owners, local developers 
and local governments.  
 
3.1 TEAM OWNER PERSPECTIVE 
The contemporary environment of the professional sports industry affords team owners 
the upper hand in stadium negotiations. This power stems from a professional sports 
franchise’s ability to threaten to relocate to another city if they are not given the 
incentives or subsidies they desire. Of course, there is no such thing as a blank check and 
communities have historically pushed back on the notion of major subsidies for stadium 
development. The friction of these negotiations has grown in recent years. Despite the 
almost engrained, ongoing profitability of today’s professional sports franchises, when 
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choosing a location for their future home, team owners have multiple legitimate concerns 
in addition to financing. 
 
LOCATION 
As is the case with all things real estate, the leading factor that drives the decision to 
develop is location. Despite the fact that sports franchises can leverage their ability to “go 
elsewhere”, the proposed location of a facility remains a central concern. Location 
defines the value and therefore cost of the land a stadium or arena is to be developed on.  
 
Location is also important to ensure a vibrant environment outside of the stadium. This 
may not be the top concern for team ownership, but owners recognize the influence the 
exterior stadium environment has on patrons. The ability of the facility to stimulate a 
sense of place is a key attribute for a sporting venue.  
 
Team owners desire a site that will be easily accessible for its fans and patrons. This 
desire often emphasizes proximity to major roads with minimal potential ingress and 
egress issues. When locating downtown there is an emphasis on easy accessibility to 
public transportation. Key methods of public transportation to sporting events are metro 
(subway) and bus. These travel options have become increasingly important as 
Americans seek to avoid traffic congestion, minimize their environmental impact, and 
reduce fuel costs. 
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POTENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD VITALITY 
Another team concern related to location is the ability to create and maintain safe 
surroundings. In many cases safety can be dependent on the potential for “activation” in 
the neighborhoods surrounding the proposed sporting venue. Often teams will seek out 
neighborhoods that are less developed but have the potential to be activated by the 
introduction of a stadium. These site decisions tend to be made in conjunction with a 
broader city plan to reactivate a dilapidated area. 
 
FINANCING 
Stadium financing relates to who pays for the construction and operation of the arena or 
stadium. The ability to receive financing incentives is a central factor driving team owner 
due diligence. Most franchises seek to leverage the local appeal of a professional sports 
team to receive some level of subsidization from the local government. Team ownership 
almost always attempts to receive substantial public subsidies for construction. Financing 
can be a huge determinant in where a franchise ultimately locates. In places, such as 
Washington, D.C. and New York, NY, where there are multiple states and cities in close 
proximity, battles can erupt between all of the nearby states and municipalities to lure 
teams to come to their market. The types of financing packages offered to teams are 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
3.2 DEVELOPER PERSPECTIVE 
Commercial real estate developers take many factors into account when considering 
whether to develop in the areas surrounding a proposed stadium or arena. Typically the 
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presence of a stadium alone is not a great enough motivator to spark commercial real 
estate investment. The presence of a stadium may create a more fertile environment for 
development, however developers must take into account the myriad of economic and 
market risks that comes with the consideration of any major development.  
 
In order to commit to substantial investment, developers must examine all of the 
characteristics of a neighborhood or submarket and its relationship to the city as a whole. 
 
LOCATION 
Location, location, location. The location of the stadium development must present 
commercial developers with a marketable environment. Commercial investment is 
unlikely to follow the development of a stadium or arena if the venue is isolated and has 
little ability to connect to nearby mature markets. The potential for connectivity is an 
important ingredient for a development to cause broad urban renewal.30 
 
When considering investment in an immature market, developers must evaluate the 
ability to “create place.” These developers must believe not only in their own ability to 
deliver but also the ability of the entire market to transform through like investments. “In 
large part, the distinctiveness of a destination development derives from the creation of 
environments that yield a sense of place for patrons and a strong sense of place for 
tenants.”31 
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Developers are also interested in proximity to the following features: public 
transportation, such as metro and bus stops; natural attractions such as a body of water or 
park; complimentary attractions such as a monument or museum; theater districts; and 
more maturely developed submarkets. In order to activate an urban locale there must be 
sufficient access to nearby attractions such as those listed above.32 
 
Ultimately, developers need to be comfortable that tenants will be willing to locate in the 
market or, more specifically, the development in question. If considering for sale 
residential product, the concern is no different. Developers also must be convinced that 
the rents they can achieve in that location will produce satisfactory returns on cost. 
 
Finally, developers must evaluate the location in terms of standard due diligence related 
to topography, environmental contamination and neighboring properties, among other 
factors. 
 
FINANCING 
Aside from being afforded density bonuses by the local government, developers also seek 
financial incentives. These financial incentives are typically provided by the local 
government as a part of a larger revitalization plan. The use of tax incremental financing 
(TIF) has become popular in cities in recent years. “Tax increment financing is a retail 
incentive program that cities use to provide funding incentives for real estate 
                                                 
32 Carr, Robert O. Carr Partners. Personal Interview. June 10, 2008 
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development projects without taking money from the city’s general funds. To raise cash, 
the city issues TIF notes that provide incentives for developers and landlords. The new 
projects’ sales tax is then used to pay back the TIF notes. Once all the notes have been 
repaid, participating retailers’ sales taxes go into (the city’s) general fund to help pay for 
schools, streets, and other services.”33 Tax credits are an additional source of alternative 
financing commercial developers can obtain in order to limit costs. 
 
Of course developers must be able to obtain competitive private financing in order to 
execute a development project. The availability of such financing is contingent upon the 
level of interest rates, the perceived project risk and other standard due diligence 
requirements.   
 
STADIUM USE 
The nature of the team or teams housed by a stadium is a significant determinant for 
development firms looking to invest in the surrounding community. Teams with longer 
seasons are more attractive than those that are only active for a short time.  
 
The typical NFL team only has 8 home games during its season, which lasts from 
September to January. This low number of home events over a relatively short time frame 
makes an NFL stadium less apt to produce the consistent traffic need to spur broad 
neighborhood revitalization.  
 
                                                 
33 Downtown DC BID_1. Pamphlet. Downtown DC BID’s Retail Incentive Program. 
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Major League Baseball teams have roughly 80 home games per season. These contests 
take place between April and October. Due to the high number of games, baseball can 
generate substantial traffic to the area of the stadium over the course of a season. The key 
limitation to ballparks is their often-awkward footprint and their lesser ability to house 
alternative functions. Furthermore, indoor arenas often house professional basketball, 
college basketball and ice hockey, while football and baseball teams tend to play in single 
use athletic facilities. 
 
The typical NBA team has roughly 40 home games between October and April, making it 
a strong engine for pedestrian traffic in the neighborhood surrounding the arena. NBA 
arenas are also the most compact of the three major professional sports in America, 
requiring less land than football and baseball stadiums. Basketball teams also commonly 
share their arena with a professional hockey franchise, further expanding potential 
attendance over the course of a year. These arenas are also used for college basketball, 
concerts and other major events. Thus, multi-use arenas are an ideal format for urban 
revitalization efforts.  
 
Developers recognize that the longer the season and the more teams housed, the more 
consistent the traffic around the venue. The ability to host non athletic events is also 
viewed as a bonus and traffic driver. The ability of a sports facility to draw traffic from 
other markets on a consistent basis allows a multiplier effect to take place in the area 
surrounding the arena during events. Spectators are likely to visit the various retail stores 
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and restaurants nearby before and after a given event. This is a very alluring prospect for 
developers. 
 
ZONING 
Commercial real estate developers desire zoning regulations that justify the price they 
must pay for land. While zoning officials may ignore this want in the course of a typical 
development project, these guidelines take on increased importance when associated with 
plans for the renewal of an entire submarket. In many cases developers will seek density 
bonuses for residential product (particularly if there is an affordable housing requirement) 
in order to compensate for the relatively low-income stream per square foot compared to 
a use such as office. City planning offices sometimes create zoning overlays, which 
afford these bonuses, in an attempt to induce residential construction in urban areas. This 
type of symbiotic planning is attractive to developers. It is also key to create a dynamic 
balance of uses. 
 
Developers, and city officials alike, often seek to mix uses in a central urban setting. City 
zoning can stimulate the development of a 24-hour setting by requiring diversity among 
the allowed uses. If implemented properly, a diversity requirement limits the probability 
of the oversupply of a single product type. This, in turn, allows landlords to maximize 
their rents and maintain a viable balance of energy. An emphasis on diverse zoning 
regulations surrounding a proposed sports facility enables landlords to offer office, 
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residential and retail product, creating a dynamic environment for the submarket and an 
attractive setting for tenants of all types.34 
 
SAFETY AND SANITATION 
Neighborhood safety (or the potential for safety) is a significant concern for developers 
when considering investment in the area. These commercial developers seek to ensure 
that their future tenants will not be subjected to substantial levels of crime. Desirable, 
high-level office tenants, such as legal or financial firms, do not want to settle down in 
downtrodden markets with high levels of crime. Likewise, developers desire an 
environment that will be sanitary and, at a minimum, comfortably “walkable” for the 
average worker. Robert Carr, who has developed millions of square feet in Downtown 
Washington, DC, cited tenant safety as one of his foremost concerns when evaluating the 
viability of a neighborhood for development.35 
 
If a planned stadium location has trouble with crime and cleanliness, commercial real 
estate firms frequently look to the local government to enact policies that will limit or 
eradicate this problem in the future. Often times a city will establish a building 
improvement district or BID in order to oversee street maintenance, security, parking, 
safety and sanitation of a downtown district. 
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PROFITS 
Of course the life’s blood of any business venture in our capitalist system is the ability to 
achieve profits. Thus, commercial development firms focus on the ability of their 
investment to produce returns commensurate with the risks. Key components to 
achieving satisfactory returns are the ability to acquire land for a reasonable price; the 
ability to develop the property within budget and on time; the ability to lease the property 
in a timely manner; the ability to achieve pro forma rental rates, the likelihood of market 
appreciation of the real estate product over time; and the ability to liquidate the 
investment. 
 
3.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE 
Over the past decade sports venues have emerged as destination developments and have 
become part of municipal planners’ efforts to revitalize downtown districts.36 “Cities 
around the nation have recognized the catalytic effect of these projects. In 2000, over 20 
cities - from San Jose, California, to Charlotte, North Carolina - were pursuing 
destination developments as the linchpin for district-wide redevelopment efforts.”37 
 
Ultimately, the local government and its derivative organizations have the loudest voice 
in a stadium debate. Successful implementation of a strategy to use stadium development 
as a cornerstone for greater urban renewal is highly dependent on the participation of city 
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officials. Indeed, local governments have the widest range of concerns related to the 
development of a stadium.  
 
“Realizing that the vitality of the downtown is essential to the economic health of an 
entire region, governments at all levels have undertaken a spectrum of legislative and 
economic actions aimed at encouraging redevelopment, revitalization, adaptive use, and 
infill development. The goals of these revitalization efforts have typically included 
raising property values and taxes, increasing sales tax revenues, stemming crime, creating 
employment in the construction industry, creating jobs, improving civic image, and 
attracting tourists.”38 Stadium development can be catalyst to these and other benefits, 
however the local government must also act to ensure that these benefits do not come at 
the cost of other important public outlays. “Today, justification for the public’s 
investment in the building of sports facilities incorporate a discussion of both the 
redevelopment efforts that can be led or jump-started by ballparks and arenas and the 
micro-level impacts of sports facilities and events on downtown areas.”39 In order to 
successfully implement urban activation through stadium development, the local 
government must create some level of urban renewal or economic stimulus, and maintain 
an acceptable standard of care for its citizens and the aggregate public infrastructure. 
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LOCAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The presence of one or more professional franchises in a city brings with it a distinct 
local and national prominence. Television coverage provides a global marketing platform 
for the city as well as the team. Professional athletic contests draw spectators from not 
only the region but in many cases from around the country and the world. For example it 
is unlikely many Americans would be familiar with Green Bay, Wisconsin were it not for 
the NFL’s Green Bay Packers. Thus, the Packers create a focal point on the global stage 
for their host city. What’s more the passion attributed to Packers’ fans represents the 
dynamic local pride for the organization. 
 
A professional sports franchise provides a city’s citizens a common cause to root for. The 
team can be a point of personal identification and pride. Furthermore, the presence of a 
local sports franchise is often a defining factor for how citizens view themselves and 
relate to others from rival cities. A shining example is the rivalry of the New York 
Yankees and the Boston Red Sox. While this rivalry began on the field, it has spilled into 
the fabric and soul of both cities. Cities are very cognizant of the transcendent nature of 
professional sports franchises and the pride they instill in the hearts of the citizens. While 
it is hard to put an economic value on this relationship, it is undeniably desirable for 
every city. “These noneconomic arguments sometimes are most effective in convincing 
the citizens of a city that the presence of a sports franchise is important. In the pursuit of 
a franchise, it is often confusing to distinguish between the actual dollars-and-cents value 
of a franchise and other, less tangible societal values.”40 
                                                 
40 Shropshire, Kenneth (1995) The Sports Franchise Game. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. p 4. 
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LOCATION 
Most American cities have constrained amounts of urban land that can be dedicated to 
stadium or arena construction. In many cases the land may be more valuable if it is 
subdivided and used for office development or some other standard commercial use. 
Thus, most cities seek to make the stadium development a piece of a larger plan to 
revitalize a specific area of the city that may not be able to reactivate without some 
watershed stimulus or anchor. “When new sports venues are built, complimentary 
businesses, including restaurants and retail, are often drawn to the area to take advantage 
of the larger game day crowds. In otherwise blighted areas, such an influx of additional 
amenities and businesses can spur construction and renovation, job creation, and 
increased tax revenues.”41 
 
There has been a recent trend towards utilizing stadium development as a catalyst for 
broader urban renewal in an urban submarket. Oftentimes cities will seek out rundown, 
downtrodden, long-stagnant areas for the stadium sites. Beyond their potential for 
reactivation, these areas largely represent the only location in a city with enough vacant 
or underused land to support the level of development required. The other enticing 
characteristic of these tracts of land is that they are relatively cheap when compared to 
the established, dense urban markets. The advantages of this strategy are that there are 
often fewer permanent residents and fewer employers in these dilapidated areas. 
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Stadium development in these broken neighborhoods can help to reduce crime; re-
energize the local economy; create a more safe, livable environment; and provide 
connections between parts of the city that previously stood on their own. Locations that 
were once avoided can become a destination for entertainment, dining and other retail 
uses. The infusion of residential and office product can complete the transformation of 
these areas into a 24-hour environment.42 
 
FINANCING 
“In the vast majority of destination developments, the public spaces, amenities, and 
infrastructure require an active public sector with both a commitment to the project and 
the required resources. In turn…the participation of the public sector implies that the 
destination developments must often fulfill a public purpose.”43 Accordingly, the local 
government has two major financial concerns when considering urban stadium or arena 
development as catalyst to urban renewal/ revitalization. The first is whether or not public 
funding will be allotted for the construction of the stadium. Many argue that city 
contributions to stadium financing act to reduce the amount of funds available for other 
government programs such as educational funding. Thus, the local government and its 
citizens must be convinced of the net benefit that a stadium can bring to the area in order 
to proceed with stadium development. Proponents of stadium or arena development 
believe a net city benefit can be achieved through increases in construction jobs, 
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Edition Title: Developing Urban Retail Centers) Washington, D.C.: ULI – the Urban Land Institute.  
43 Ibid. p 75. 
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permanent jobs, tax revenues, and other benefits that are harder to quantify, resulting 
from such development.44 
 
The second financial consideration is how to promote development in the areas 
surrounding the stadium. This promotion facilitates the opportunity for urban renewal. 
Local governments can offer TIF packages in order to stimulate retail and other 
commercial development. As stated earlier, the development of a dynamic mix of uses in 
the area neighboring the sporting facility is key to the ultimate realization of a revitalized 
urban setting. If the city can properly encourage commercial developers to construct 
office, residential and retail in the emerging market, it can ensure the creation of office 
jobs, retail jobs and a dynamic tax generator. 
 
CITY REVENUE 
The development of a stadium and the consequent presence of sporting events can help to 
catalyze local development and renewal. With this revitalization can come increases in a 
myriad of tax revenues for the city.  
 
Commercial real estate development alone increases property tax revenue on many 
fronts. The value of existing properties increases due to the increase in safety, sanitation, 
aesthetics, neighborhood perception and, transitively, the rents that properties can achieve 
from these improvements. At the same time, new commercial development increases the 
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number of properties in the area, thus drastically increasing the number of taxable 
properties. 
 
The combination of a professional sports facility and subsequent commercial real estate 
investment allows for uses that would not have otherwise located in the area. As the 
vitality of the sports entertainment anchored market increases, hotels, apartments and 
condominiums are often introduced. The hotels generate hotel tax. Meanwhile, the 
residential products create property tax and income tax revenues for the city. 
Furthermore, the presence of these uses also helps to stimulate retail, restaurant and 
entertainment consumption; providing an even greater tax basis.45 
 
A unique characteristic of revitalization in a sports or entertainment anchored area is the 
multiplier effect that these uses have on the surrounding businesses. The setting of such a 
dynamic sports entertainment district attracts traffic to the area from more distant tertiary 
markets. Patrons of the sports facility are more likely to visit the local restaurants, hotels 
and shops; thus causing an added boost to the revenues of these shops. The ability to 
capture this commuter traffic attracts retail and restaurant businesses to the market, 
increasing tax revenue and further revitalizing the urban fabric. A dynamic mix of uses 
can have a catalytic effect on the overall vitality of the area by reducing the “down times” 
in the submarket. The presence of office, retail, residential, hotel, restaurant, 
                                                 
45 Widdicombe, Gerry_1. Downtown DC BID. Personal Interview. July 16, 2008. 
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entertainment and sports entertainment product creates a 24/7, 365 day-a-year activity 
center for the city. This consistent activity maximizes the potential tax revenue.46 
 
DISPLACEMENT 
City activists often cite displacement of lower income residents as a key problem related 
to urban development and subsequent gentrification. In the case of stadium development 
aimed at the repositioning of an entire submarket, this issue often emerges as a key 
concern for local residents. It goes without saying, that an effect of urban renewal on this 
scale is a broad increase in rents and prices across all product types. Local activists view 
the resulting displacement of those who can no longer to afford to live in the area as a 
negative effect, which it certainly is for those effected. However, if urban renewal is the 
goal of the city, it must accept that some people will be “priced out” of the market. This 
is not an effect limited to urban development. Take for example the effect of sprawl into 
once-rural suburbs. As greater portions of the population spreads out from the city and 
raises the demand for land in the suburbs, some existing residents in those suburbs may 
be forced to move elsewhere due to changes in rent and pricing. This effect is, in most 
cases, a harsh reality of development that cannot be easily avoided.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
The past couple of years have brought an increased focus on environmental awareness in 
both the private and public sectors. As a result, local governments have begun to put a 
premium on transit oriented stadium (or arena) development (TOSD). Accordingly, 
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proximity to an existing metro stop is highly encouraged if not required for the approval 
of venue development. Through this requirement, cities aim to alleviate automobile 
congestion and the pollution it causes. Bus systems, whether existing or implemented in 
conjunction with the broader revitalization plans, compliment the metro and add another 
method of transportation for the public. A corollary benefit of the emphasis on public 
transportation is that as ridership increases so too do the city’s public transportation 
revenues.47 
 
The emphasis on TOSD also limits the number of parking structures in and around the 
sporting facility. In many, cases the local government will put a limit on the amount of 
dedicated structured parking allowed at the venue. A parallel benefit from urban stadium 
development is that the surrounding office garages, which are in use during the workday, 
can be used for excess automobile traffic to sporting events, thus generating higher 
revenues. This symbiotic relationship benefits the office landlords who own and operate 
these garages in proximity to the venue.48 
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4.0 VERIZON CENTER CASE STUDY 
According to a 2007 press release penned by the Verizon Center Public Relations office 
of Washington Sports and Entertainment, LP,  
Ten years later Verizon Center continues as a shining example for other 
cities looking to redevelop and revitalize downtown neighborhoods. 
Recently, with the opening of the new Prudential Center arena in Newark, 
New Jersey, SportsIllustrated.com referenced Verizon Center as a building 
to emulate, and the Star Ledger declared that, because of Verizon Center, 
“the neighborhood along 7th Street NW has evolved from one of the most 
depressed areas in the nation’s capital into a planner’s dream 
neighborhood of hotels, restaurants, stores and people on the streets at all 
hours.” 
 
There is no doubt that the development of the Verizon Center (formerly the MCI Center)  
– opening in 1997 and home to Washington, DC’s Wizards NBA franchise and Capitals 
NHL franchise – was a key element in the revitalization of the city’s Downtown. The 
Verizon Center was primarily a catalyst in the sense that it changed the city’s vision of 
the type of “place” that could be created in the Washington, DC submarket known as the 
East End. With the arena’s development, commercial real estate developers also began to 
recognize the potential for this underused area to become much more than another office 
corridor, operating actively only a “9 to 5” basis.  
 
In retrospect, the Verizon Center was the cornerstone for a larger development that built 
upon it. Specifically, it created an immense sports entertainment anchor that encouraged 
dynamic mixed-use development between its 7th Street location and 14th Street to the 
west. Considering the dilapidated state of this area less than twenty years ago, and 
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witnessing the vibrant urban community that exists today, for longtime DC residents and 
developers the impact is clear. However, most DC developers and planners involved in 
the area will concede that it was not solely the development of the Verizon Center that 
led to the broad urban renewal that occurred in Downtown Washington, DC. According 
to Ellen McCarthy, head of the Zoning & Land Use Practice at Nixon Peabody LLP and 
former Director of the DC Office of Planning, “the development of the Verizon Center 
accelerated development” in the area in conjunction with some key city programs.49 
Indeed, the Verizon Center preceded a number of city revitalization initiatives that fanned 
the flames of Downtown development. The Verizon Center was the spark that started a 
fire of urban revitalization in Washington, DC’s East End. A fire that was ultimately set 
ablaze by a confluence of city initiatives and commercial real estate investment.  
 
The Verizon Center is located on 7th Street between F Street and H Street in the 
northwest quadrant of Washington, DC. It is in the East End submarket. The area is also 
known as the downtown district. The arena is the size of a city block and is constructed of 
steel and concrete. Its façade is a combination of glass and concrete with a modern design 
that goes beyond the traditional “big box” arena design. A large video screen is also part 
of its 7th Street exterior façade. The sports arena can seat 20,000 spectators and is 
accompanied by an additional 70,000 of retail and entertainment space.50 Today the arena 
averages approximately 2.5 million visitors a year and acts as a sports entertainment 
anchor for its entire submarket.51 
                                                 
49 McCarthy, Ellen. Nixon Peabody. Personal Interview. July 15, 2008. 
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  Figure 4 – Map of Downtown DC 
4.1 NEIGHBORHOOD BACKGROUND 
The Verizon Center is located in a section of Washington that was considered the heart of 
the city for many years. The area, spanning almost 20 blocks along Pennsylvania Avenue 
from the White House in the west to the U.S. Capitol building in the east, was the nerve 
center of the capital city for the majority of the 19th century. During the Civil War it was 
very much the center of the city, with F Street representing the heart of Washington’s 
retail district. President Lincoln was assassinated while taking in a play at Ford’s Theater, 
only blocks away from the current site of the sports arena. The neighborhood maintained 
a certain prominence until the urban flight of the 1950s and the riots of the late 1960s. 
These events motivated developers to look west of the White House for office 
development, leaving the East End, effectively, for dead. Over the almost fifty years 
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since the 1968 riots this section of downtown Washington, DC witnessed a steep decline 
in activity that was not remedied until the development of the Verizon Center in 1997 and 
the subsequent development and revitalization that occurred in the area.52 
 
The end of World War II and the baby boom led to mass urban flight to the suburbs 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Citizens of Washington looked north, south and west of the 
city for their piece of the American dream. This urban flight left the downtown core of 
Washington, DC almost lifeless. The area along Pennsylvania Avenue between 16th and 
7th Streets was dealt another blow in 1968 when social and racial friction sparked national 
riots that saw many urban centers burned to the ground. Suddenly, Washington’s East 
End was not only undesirable; it was destroyed and unsafe.53 
 
Granted “Home Rule” in 1973 by the federal government, the District could finally 
operate its own city. As a result, “in a historic leap for greater self-determination, District 
citizens elected a Mayor and Council in the fall of 1974.”54 In the years that followed the 
City of Washington considered many potential plans to reinvigorate its downtown core. 
The city attempted to stimulate retail development and activity through a series of mini-
mall developments along F Street. The mini-mall style developments required permanent 
street closure to allow for pedestrian foot traffic. At the same time, the city encouraged 
department stores to enter the Downtown market to compliment the intended draw of the 
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F Street destinations.55 These attempts largely failed to bring life back to the downtown 
area due to a lack of density and overall poor planning and design. The 1970s were the 
years of suburban sprawl and suburban mini-malls; shoppers had no interest in 
Downtown Washington, DC other than to visit the national monuments and museums. 
Thus, most of the buildings - between 16th Street, 7th Street and the U.S. Capitol further to 
the east - deteriorated or were simply abandoned. In addition, the development of the DC 
region’s Metro Rail system in 1976 left the downtown area scarred from the extensive 
subterranean work.56 
 
By the 1980s the majority of office and retail development in Washington was located 
west of the White House at 16th Street. Some development had occurred immediately east 
of the White House but 15th Street was viewed as the line of demarcation for 
contemporary development. The blocks to the east were filled with untapped, 
downtrodden, concrete structures. It was recognized that, in order to bring life into the 
blocks of the East End, there would need to be broad cooperation and investment by all 
interested parties. The strong economy and transitive development boom of the 1980s 
forced commercial real estate developers to consider a foray east of the line of 
demarcation. Office demand in the city rose through the mid to late 1980s and many 
thought that the underdeveloped downtown core could be the logical progression of the 
development that was beginning to push east through 14th Street.57 
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However, 14th Street and the market to the east were stained with poverty, drug use and 
crime. Its sidewalks and streets were in disrepair, creating an unsettling environment for 
potential tenants. In addition, the total lack of residents in the area further darkened its 
already ugly personality. The vast amount of public capital required to refurbish these 
deficiencies in infrastructure created a real hurdle. Compounding this issue was the fact 
that the City of Washington suffered from poor management.58  
 
City officials and developers could not agree on the proper balance of zoning and 
financial incentives required to effect change and investment in the East End. Many 
developers and officials visualized something more than an urban office park in this area. 
Planning activists desired the injection of residential and entertainment uses in this 
corridor. Throughout the mid 1980s there were disputes related to the required level of 
historic preservation, the creation of land use maps, the establishment of density bonuses 
to spur residential development, and the method of implementing the variety of proposed 
downtown development programs. The District began to realize it would require some 
sort of lead entity to address these issues. Momentum was building to create a 
comprehensive plan to revitalize the area, although the specifics of the plan remained 
elusive. Then in 1990 the real estate market started to slow down. The recession that 
occurred through 1991 brought development to a virtual halt in the city.59 
 
As development began to return to the city in 1992 and 1993, developers again set their 
sights on the swath of underdeveloped land east of 14th Street. A number of planning 
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groups existed during the 1990s with hopes to map out a comprehensive plan for the area. 
These groups included the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation (PADC), the 
Committee of 100, the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC), the Interactive 
Downtown Task force, and the Downtown DC BID. Still, the individual groups had 
different views on how the plan should be implemented. Key points of contention were 
the city’s desire for residential housing, the perceived higher value of office development, 
a want for historical preservation, and the desire to create a dynamic, “living,” mixed-use 
market.60 
 
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s DC Mayor Marion Barry was interested in the 
possibility of bringing Washington’s NBA and NHL franchises into the city. At the time, 
these franchises were housed at the Capital Center (aka US Air Arena) in Landover, MD. 
Though it did not come to fruition under his watch, Barry did much to set in motion the 
relocation that would follow.  
 
Finally, in the early 1990s, this hope became a real possibility. Due to the lack of 
development in Downtown DC, the city owned a substantial number of sites that were 
not fulfilling their highest and best use. In addition, the fact that it would be an indoor 
arena made the footprint of the venue a far smaller issue than it would have been for a 
football or baseball stadium. The city focused on a large site along 7th Street in the 
struggling East End market. The site was only blocks from the National Mall and many 
of the Federal Government buildings. Much like the coliseum in Rome, the arena would 
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stand in the center of the capital of a nation. For those hoping that it would have a 
catalytic effect on urban renewal, the site was viewed as ideal because it was 
approximately five blocks east of any major contemporary development and could act as 
an eastern entertainment anchor that would stimulate developers to “fill in” the area 
between 14th Street and 7 Street. Furthermore, it would create the opportunity to stimulate 
mixed-use development and thus avoid the lifeless qualities of an exclusively office 
market. The new arena was approved for development by the Washington DC 
government in 1994.61 
 
4.2 THE DEAL 
The Verizon Center was approved for development by the Washington, DC government 
in 1994. The city, and Washington Wizards and Capitals owner Abe Pollin, viewed the 
development as a vehicle to bring people back to what used to be the heart of the city. 
The site of the arena is on the eastern edge of an area that connects the White House to 
Union Station and The U.S. Capitol building. Development in the city over course of the 
1980s and early 1990s had not proliferated to a great degree east of 14th Street. The 
Verizon Center, which was to be built on 7th Street to the east, was intended to have an 
anchoring effect for the blocks of underused and greatly dilapidated space that spanned 
west to 14th Street. It would create a bookend that would encourage the development and 
revitalization of the East End market that was essentially bounded by these streets.62 
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In order to bring these effects to fruition, the city provided financial support for the 
development of the arena. The City of Washington contributed a net total of $60 million 
to the development of the Verizon Center. It provided a below market land lease for the 
site that represented a net present value of $20 million in funding. The city also provided 
$20 million in property tax abatements based on a calculation of the net present value of 
the annual abatements to be provided. Finally the city contributed $20 million in cash for 
the demolition of existing structures and the redevelopment of the Metro Rail stop 
located at 7th and F Streets. In addition to this $60 million dollar infusion, the city issued 
Arena Revenue Bonds in the amount of $43 million to further fund the redevelopment of 
the Metro Rail station. However, these bonds are repaid through a gross receipts Arena 
Tax on all businesses in the area and therefore do not represent an increase in the city 
budget’s net contribution of $60 million.  Most recently, in 2007, the City of Washington 
allowed an increase in the ticket and merchandising sales tax related to the Verizon 
Center. This increase from 5.75% to 10% financed $50 million of improvements at the 
arena. One highlight of these improvements was the installation of the country’s first 
indoor high definition scoreboard.63 
 
Team owner Abe Pollin provided the balance of funds for the $303 million arena 
development. He contributed approximately $200 million. Credit should be given to 
Pollin for not attempting to relocate the development as a result of the relatively limited 
funding provided by the City of Washington. Pollin recognized the value of the site and 
the potential impact it could have on the surrounding area. 
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As a result of this public – private cooperation, the Verizon Center opened on December 
2, 1997 with the Washington Wizards defeating the Seattle Supersonics 95-78.64 As the 
Verizon Center attracted massive foottraffic to the East End, submarket developers 
became more convinced of the emerging viability of the revitalization of the entire 
downtown area. At the same time, city planners at the Downtown DC BID and the DC 
Office of Planning recognized an opportunity to implement specific development plans, 
policies and programs that would fuel commercial real estate investment in the market 
and achieve the high level of urban renewal that now seemed possible. 
 
4.3 CITY DEVELOPMENT PLANS, POLICIES & PROGRAMS 
The development of the Verizon Center provided an eastern anchor on 7th Street (NW 
Washington, DC) that paved the way for expansion eastward from the previous 
development demarcation line at 14th Street. Suddenly, the area in between these streets 
was viewed as prime for commercial real estate investment. Few doubted that, in the 
years to come, this area could transform into a vibrant connection between the White 
House and the United States Capitol building. The question was what type of 
development would actually unfold.  
 
In order to induce the development of a dynamic mix of office, residential, retail, cultural, 
and entertainment uses; the City of Washington, along with the Downtown DC BID, set 
out to create a number of development incentives. Looking back, it is hard to deny the 
                                                 
64 Washington Sports & Entertainment, LP. Press Release. Verizon Center 10th Anniversary Press Release. 
2007. 
 
 53 
impact that this confluence of events and policies had on the transformation of the East 
End into a vibrant 24-hour urban community. 
 
The City of Washington implemented a number of plans, policies and programs, which 
complimented the development of the Verizon Center and, ultimately, helped lead to the 
revitalization of East End of the city. These platforms ranged from the creation of a 
business improvement district (BID) to financing incentives for commercial real estate 
developers. 
 
DOWNTOWN DC BID 
“The Downtown Business Improvement District (BID) is a tax-funded nonprofit that 
works to revitalize the city's urban core. The District covers a 140-block neighborhood 
near the U.S. Capitol to the White House where property owners tax themselves to make 
their community cleaner, safer and more vibrant. The tax is used by the BID to purchase 
services and capital improvements that supplement those provided by the city.”65 
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Figure 5 – Map of Downtown DC BID 
The Downtown DC BID was created in November of 1997 to support a clean, safe and 
friendly environment in downtown Washington, DC. Since its creation, the BID has 
sought to help transform downtown DC into a premier, commercial, cultural and 
entertainment destination. The BID expanded its homeless outreach with the creation of 
its Downtown Service Center. “The Downtown BID created and operates the Downtown 
Services Center (DSC) as a multi-service, comprehensive, drop-in center for homeless 
adults in the center of its district.”66 As it increased its focus on the welfare of the public, 
the DC BID also began to work towards the stimulation of its physical development. 
Accordingly, the mission of the BID expanded to “providing stability to developers and 
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investors in the marketplace.” The DC BID’s goal of establishing a central retail market 
at 7th and F Streets led to a 2000 “Action Agenda” for the entire downtown district.67 
 
DOWNTOWN ACTION AGENDA 
The Downtown Action Agenda, penned in 2000 by the DC Office of Planning in 
coordination with the Downtown DC BID, had four central objectives. The first was to 
maximize and concentrate downtown housing. The second objective was to “increase the 
vitality of street life”. Third was to “provide clear direction for downtown growth and 
new development.”    The final objective was to “connect downtown economic growth to 
district residents.”68  
 
DOWNTOWN INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS 
The Downtown DC BID and the city reopened multiple blocks along F Street and G 
Street in the downtown district, which were previously closed off and used as “Pedestrian 
Malls.” Intended to operate somewhat like the current 3rd Street Promenade in Santa 
Monica, California, these attempts at creating retail marketplaces had failed over the 
years leading up to their redevelopment. 
 
In 1997 the City of Washington reopened the 700 and 800 blocks of F Street (directly 
adjacent to the Verizon Center) and the 500 block of 8th Street (just southwest of the 
Verizon Center). Later in 2000, the 900 block of G Street was reopened. According to the 
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Downtown DC BID, this was a symbolic investment representing the idea that “the city is 
open for business.”69 
 
The City of Washington contributed $4 million to the reopening and infrastructure 
upgrades of these blocks. The funding was viewed as a practical investment that served to 
reduce shadowy areas conducive to crime, and also served to create better access and 
traffic circulation around the Verizon Center.70 
 
From 2001 to 2007 the City of Washington funded streetscape improvements throughout 
the downtown district in the aggregate amount of $15 million. These improvements 
served to further enhance the downtown image and provide a clean setting for pedestrian 
traffic.71 
 
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FUNDING 
Over the recent years the metropolitan DC area has created a long-term capital funding 
program for the region’s Metro Rail system. The plan, set to be approved in 2008, will 
put into motion a 10 year, $3 billion capital improvement program for the DC 
metropolitan metro system. The funding consists of $1.5 billion in Federal allocations 
and $1.5 billion in local funding over ten years. The local portion of the money will be 
made up of  $500 million per state/district in contributions from Maryland, Virginia and 
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Washington, DC. The improvements are aimed at maintaining and expanding metro 
service as ridership increases throughout the region.72  
 
DOWNTOWN RETAIL TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
“In an effort to attract the highest quality retailers and merchants to Downtown, 
Washington, DC, has established the District’s Retail Incentive Program with tax 
increment financing (TIF) to encourage those stores that qualify to locate in the 
Downtown TIF district with the benefit of cash incentives to offset the costs of building a 
new store.”73 Approved in 2003, the DC retail TIF program sold $30 million of TIF debt 
notes. The program succeeded in attracting “high-impact” retail tenants to the downtown 
market surrounding the Verizon Center. Specifically, it made funding available to offset 
the tenant improvement costs for qualified, “anchor” retailers and focused on the area 
immediately surrounding the arena. It’s goal was to further encourage investment in the 
East End.74 
 
$9.5 million was allocated to three major retailers: H & M (clothing), West Elm 
(furniture), and Zara (clothing). The financing is also available to “for profit” museums. 
$6.5 million in aggregate funding is currently proposed for Madame Tussaud’s Wax 
Museum and the Crime and Punishment Museum. A final example of the TIF in action is 
the proposed $4.5 million for Balducci’s, a boutique, high-end grocery store.75 
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As stated in the previous chapter, a portion of retail sales tax will repay the TIF notes, 
putting no strain on the City of Washington’s budget. This program, assisting the further 
revitalization of the area, would not have been possible without the momentum created 
by the development of the Verizon Center. For instance, a monotone office market would 
have almost no ability to attract this type of retail tenant. 
 
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 
Perhaps the most important catalytic actions by the City of Washington were the 
introduction of a zoning overlay and residential property tax abatements for the 
Downtown district of Washington. From 1991 to 2002 only 81 residential units had been 
constructed in the area. Following the 1997 opening of the Verizon Center, life began to 
reemerge in the East End. Accordingly, the City of Washington sought to increase 
residential development in the area and, in 2000, began to discuss the potential to provide 
zoning and tax relief as an incentive. 
 
The city approved the implementation of zoning changes and tax abatements in 2002. 
The zoning overlay removed the previous residential requirements for 0.5 FAR of 
recreational space per site. It also eliminated the existing height and FAR requirements. 
This flexibility was backstopped by the constrained site sizes in Downtown DC and the 
overriding maximum height limit related to national monuments. The changes were 
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estimated by the DC Office of Planning to allow for 1 or 2 additional floors per 
building.76 
 
The tax abatement was implemented in the form of a $0.81 per rentable square foot 
property tax credit for residential properties. The amount of the credit was calculated to 
boost landlord cash flow yields by 50 basis points on their market rate rental properties. 
Previously, developers had worried that residential deals would not meet underwriting 
requirements because of a perceived inability to achieve rents at a level that would offset 
total development costs.77 
 
In the end, this combination of residential incentives led to the development of 2,700 
apartment and condominium units from 2003 to mid 2008.78 There would have been 
almost no interest in residential development had the Verizon Center not sparked the 
infusion of national retailers and cultural attractions to the area. This spark paved the way 
for retail TIF funding, which in turn created vibrant environment that was ripe for 
residential development.79 
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4.4 DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
 This section provides a brief summary of some of the more significant real estate 
developments surrounding the Verizon Center in the East End and how they were 
achieved. 
 
WALTER E. WASHINGTON CONVENTION CENTER 
Known as the “new convention center” to DC residents, development of the 2.3 million 
square foot Walter E. Washington Convention Center was initially approved by the City 
of Washington in 1998.80 It represented a “catalytic $850 million project intended to 
support the city’s hotel industry with a modern and competitive convention center.”81 The 
convention center is located approximately one half mile north of the Verizon Center.  
 
While some may argue that the convention center itself could represent a direct stimulus 
for the revitalization of Downtown DC, the fact that the substantial existing convention 
center in Washington, DC was located only two blocks away limits the credulity of such 
a claim. Events that were housed at the former convention center would simply be held 
two blocks away at the new facility, thus limiting a real change in visitor travel. The 
modern design and amenities of the new convention center added to the revitalization that 
had been kicked off by the Verizon Center when it was approved four years earlier. 
However, the development of the new convention center did not represent the same 
“game changing” injection to the market as the professional sports facility.  
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A peripheral advantage of the approval and development of the Washington Convention 
Center was the fact that, in the future, it would open the existing or “old convention 
center” site up for the development of residential product, retail product, public space and 
public parking. This redevelopment, expected to commence in 2008, represents the city 
of DC’s desire to further encourage a “Living Downtown.” Accordingly, the newer, more 
modern center was certainly a piece of the downtown revitalization puzzle that came 
together during the late 1990s and early 2000s.82 
 
The new convention center project was funded with the help of the city government. The 
city contributed the land for the development of the new center, an estimated value of $40 
million.  Financing was also complimented by the city issuance of $580 million in 
“Convention Center revenue bonds.” These revenue bonds did not represent a net 
investment from the city because the Convention Center’s restaurant and hotel agreed to 
repay these bonds via an allocation of their sales taxes. As of July 2008, 1% of the 10% 
restaurant sales tax and 4.45% of the 14.5% hotel sales tax are dedicated to the repayment 
of these bonds.83 
 
The city projects an annual attendance of approximately 1 million visitors to the Walter 
E. Washington Convention Center. The projected demand for hotel “room nights” in 
2007 is 600,000.84 
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GALLERY PLACE 
Gallery Place was perhaps the second most important catalyst to the revitalization of 
Washington, DC’s East End (after the Verizon Center). Abutting the Verizon Center to 
the north, this dynamic mixed-use development is a perfect compliment to the arena. 
Together these two developments form an essential sports entertainment anchor for the 
entire East End and downtown market as a whole. The project includes restaurants, 
retailers, a 13-screen movie theater and sits directly on top of a metro stop. Today, this 
development is a key driver of traffic to the area with a projected average 6 million 
visitors per year.85 Still, as Tom Wilbur, Senior Vice President of Development at 
Akridge, points out, the project would have been very difficult to realize without the 
presence of the Verizon Center to the south.86 
 
Gallery Place was approved for development in 1999. The site would likely have been 
developed as a pure office project had the city not provided $75 million in Tax 
Incremental Financing.87 The TIF was intended to support the projected catalytic effect of 
the development on retail and housing in the area.88 The $300 million project was 
completed by Akridge in 2004. 
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In addition to 210,000 square feet of office space and 192 residential condominium units; 
Gallery Place is currently home to Clyde’s Restaurant, Regal Cinemas, Bed Bath & 
Beyond, City Sports, Lucky Strike bowling, and Washington Sports Club – among many 
other retail tenants. Gallery Place and the Verizon Center continue to be the central 
engine for retail patronage and overall foot traffic in the heart of Washington, DC’s East 
End. Together they create a multiplier effect in the area that helps to maximize city tax 
revenues.89 
 
SHAKESPEARE THEATER SIDNEY HARMAN HALL 
Located directly to the south of the Verizon Center, the Shakespeare Theater’s Sidney 
Harman Hall is home to a 775-seat performance theater. The International Union of 
Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers resides above the theater in the 11-story building. The 
theater is another key generator of tourist traffic. It is worth noting that theaters are 
typically credited with one of the highest multiplier factors due to the tendency of its 
patrons to pair their theater visit with a meal and other retail consumption.90 
 
Development of the new theater was proposed around 2000, approved by the city in 
2002, and completed by CarrAmerica and JM Zell Partners in 2007. The project cost was 
approximately $90 million according to the DC Downtown BID.91 The City of 
Washington contributed $20 million in cash to the financing of the project in order to 
fulfill its arts initiatives. Further TIF dollars in the amount of $10 million was specifically 
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allocated to the Shakespeare Theater. The Shakespeare Theater was also able to raise 
funds from various contributors.92 
 
The Shakespeare Theater adds to the dynamic mix of uses in the East End. It is one of the 
most technologically advanced performance halls in the world and is estimated to have an 
annual fiscal impact of $500,000 to $1 million per year in the area.93 It fills another 
crucial role in the ability of the neighborhood to function vibrantly 24 hours a day, 365 
days a year. According to Tom Wilbur, the theater has had a significant ability to attract 
restaurants to the area due to the nature of the typical habits of its patrons.94 However, 
this development would have been difficult to justify without the presence of the Verizon 
Center and the broad transformations to the neighborhood it effectuated from 1997 to 
2002. Had the East End become an office-focused submarket with typical workday 
activity patterns, the theater would have suffered greatly (if it was developed at all). The 
development of the Shakespeare Theater was very much facilitated by the neighborhood 
revitalization of the late 1990s.95 
 
TERRELL PLACE 
Terrell Place is a historically preserved office project with ground floor retail that was 
privately developed by CarrAmerica. The project was completed in 2003 although 
according to project developer Robert Carr it had been planned back in the mid 1990s, 
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around the time of the Verizon Center announcement.96 Totaling nearly 480,000 square 
feet, Terrell Place consists of three connected buildings of office and retail. These 
buildings include: a redevelopment of the 8-story former Hecht’s department store, a 
newly developed 9-story building that includes historic facades, and a newly developed 
11-story building.97 
 
HOTEL MONACO 
The Hotel Monaco was opened across 7th Street from the Verizon Center in 2002. It 
represented a $40 million historic renovation of the former Tariff Building and DC 
General Post Office, originally constructed in 1839.98 Prior to its redevelopment, the 
building was run down and largely unnoticed by DC residents. 
 
4.5 MARKET LEVEL RESULTS 
There can be no denying the current vitality of Washington, DC’s East End. Since 
approval in 1994, the Verizon Center has played a significant role in the revitalization of 
this market. Still, as described in section 4.2, subsequent renewal was the combined result 
of the efforts of the team owners, local developers and city officials working in tandem. 
The sports entertainment anchor created the environment that led to broad commercial 
real estate investment. Between 1998 and 2007 $4.6 billion of new development was 
completed within seven blocks of the Verizon Center. Over that same period in the same 
area 39,000 jobs were created. Furthermore, the businesses and operations in the area 
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within seven blocks of the arena accounted for a cumulative tax generation of $1.05 
billion (See Appendix 1).99 
 
PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT 
While ideas for development in the East End have percolated for almost fifty years, it was 
not until the approval of the development of the Verizon Center in 1994 that the area 
began to see large-scale commercial real estate development. Major developers such as 
Akridge, CarrAmerica and Douglas Development, who had previously invested in the 
area on a limited basis, commenced long considered plans for major development in the 
years just prior to the opening of the multi-use professional sports arena. The 
participation of these leading DC developers resulted in a sort of critical mass with each 
announced project fueling justification for the next. With the help of the zoning overlay 
and the retail TIF and historical preservation incentives, these developers were able to 
carry out a number of high profile projects such as CarrAmerica’s Terrell Place and 
Shakespeare Theater, Akridge’s Gallery Place and Kimpton’s Hotel Monaco.  
 
The development of these projects and a number of similar endeavors led directly to the 
vibrant Downtown district that the East End represents today. What’s more, due to the 
almost non-existence of residential units in the area, this revitalization did not serve to 
cause mass displacement of lower income residents or businesses. The development of 
the area was able to occur with minimal citizen upheaval. The central concerns of the 
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local community with regard to this development were city fiscal responsibility and 
historical preservation.100 
 
Figure 6 – Downtown DC BID Projects Completed 
                          
TOTAL RENTABLE/USABLE SQUARE FEET DEVELOPED (in thousands)   
Within 7 blocks of the Verizon Center               
                          
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                          
 789   264   237   -     772   1,201   1,023   1,583   1,792   2,771   1,849   1,462   2,755  
                          
Figure 7 – Downtown DC BID SF Developed per Year 
The chart above illustrates the increase in the number of square feet developed per year 
following the opening of the Verizon Center in December 1997. Note that plans to 
develop the arena were approved in 1994. It is also evident that the incentives put forth 
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by the DC Office of Planning and the Downtown DC BID in the Downtown Action 
Agenda, introduced in 2000, predicated a substantial increase in the number of square 
feet delivered per year from 2002 to 2007.  The following is a breakout of total 
development within seven blocks of the arena from 1995 to 2007 by product type: 9.8 
million square feet of office space; 920,000 square feet of retail space; 1 million square 
feet of live theater space; 492,000 square feet of museum space; 755 hotel rooms; 1,703 
apartment units; and 2,184 condominium units (see Appendix 2).101 This development 
clearly represents a dynamic mix of uses. It is also clear that this development occurred 
after the 1994 approval of the Verizon Center. Despite the fact that the city supplemented 
the catalytic effect of the arena with a number of stimulating policies, there is no doubt 
that Verizon Center was the first key piece of a dynamic mixed use puzzle that came 
together in the years to follow.  
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The area surrounding the Verizon Center represented the doldrums of the city until the 
mid 1990s. There were few jobs available in the East End due to its downtrodden, 
undesirable environment. The market was, in many ways, a blank pallet. The lack of any 
activity allowed developers to start from scratch, displacing few existing businesses. 
Accordingly, the number of jobs in downtown Washington, DC has increased 
significantly following the arrival of the Verizon Center and the subsequent urban 
renewal in the area. With the “reopening” of this market came a flood of office, retail, 
restaurant, entertainment, hotel and service workers. As these businesses began to 
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reemerge in the East End there was substantial increase in employment in the area. 
According to a November 2007 Downtown Leadership Paper, “recent Downtown job 
growth has outpaced that of the District of Columbia and the region as a whole.”102 
 
The Downtown BID area alone added approximately 57,000 jobs from 1996 through 
2006.”103 From 1998 to 2007 40,000 total jobs were created by new development within 
seven blocks of the Verizon Center. Based on the roster of planned or recently completed 
development projects, the Downtown DC BID expects another 8,000 jobs to be created in 
2008 and 2009. The chat below illustrates the number of jobs created by new 
development within seven blocks of the arena on a year-by-year basis. 
 
                    
TOTAL JOBS CREATED PER YEAR BASED ON DELIVERED PROJECTS      
Within 7 blocks of the Verizon Center             
                    
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                    
 160   2,481   4,191   3,757   5,069   6,476   7,377   1,774   2,930   6,386  
                    
Figure 8 – Jobs Created per Year 
This chart shows to substantial number of jobs created each year in close proximity to the 
Verizon Center. To better understand the impact of this job creation, one must consider 
the fact that from 1996 to the third quarter of 2007 downtown accounted for 64,450 of the 
67,000 new jobs in the entire city (recall the Downtown DC BID area was responsible for 
57,000 jobs from 1996 to 2006). That means that the downtown area was responsible for 
96% of the job creation in DC between 1996 and third quarter 2007. Over the same 
                                                 
102 Widdicombe, Gerry_3. Downtown: The Economic and Fiscal Engine of the District of Columbia. 
Downtown Leadership Paper. Downtown DC BID. November, 2007.  
103 Ibid 
 70 
period downtown increased “its share of total employment in the city from 20% to 
26%.”104 There is little question that the ongoing revitalization of Downtown DC BID 
area surrounding the Verizon Center was directly responsible for this downtown 
concentration of job growth.  
 
Another result of the increase in development and the broad revitalization of the East End 
was an increase in city tax revenues. This enhancement was spawned by the increases in 
number of workers, level of real estate development, property assessment values, and 
visitor traffic in the area. The revenues were enhanced by the newly established 24/7 365-
day a year environment. From 1998 to 2007 $1.065 billion of cumulative taxes were 
generated by the properties within seven blocks of the Verizon Center. The following 
chart shows the amount of taxes generated each year by completed real estate projects.105 
 
                    
TOTAL TAXES GENERATED PER YEAR BASED ON DELIVERED PROJECTS (in thousands) 
Within 7 blocks of the Verizon Center         
                    
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                    
 900   9,249   15,365   14,937   19,592   35,360   43,341   19,441   18,186   43,623  
                    
Figure 9 – Taxes Generated per Year 
The ability to create such tax revenue streams has allowed the City of Washington the 
flexibility to implement tax incentives like its retail TIF program. As the East End 
continues to grow and gain value so too will the tax revenue of the city. This growth has 
helped to maintain the annual budget surplus of the District of Columbia since 1997. 
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  Figure 10 – DC Annual Budget Surplus 
The increase in tax revenue, coinciding with the construction of the Verizon Center and 
the resulting gentrification of Downtown Washington, DC, has been a significant boost to 
the city economy.  This revenue increase represents yet another positive impact that a 
properly located and supported professional sports venue can have on its community. 
 
The Verizon Center also increased the use of the Metro Rail system by approximately 14 
million riders between 1997 and 2007, according to a 10th anniversary Verizon Center 
press release. It is estimated that 60% of all Verizon Center patrons use the metro to 
attend events.106 This spike in ridership provides a significant revenue boost for the Metro 
Rail system. 
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The estimated total city investment in the Verizon Center and its surrounding market was 
$400 million. The Federal Downtown investment was approximately $300. These public 
investments were complimented by $10 billion and growing of private investment. 
Beyond the aesthetic and other intangible benefits to the city, these investments have 
generated “approximately $400 million in new annual taxes in fiscal 2007 and a 
cumulative total of $1.6 billion in new taxes from 1996 through 3Q 2007.”107 
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
The role of stadiums throughout the world has evolved since the time of the ancient 
Greeks. Their place in the urban fabric has also changed over time. Over the past century, 
the professional sports industry has proliferated in the United States. The end of the 
twentieth century brought with it a rebirth of stadium development - most recently 
focused in urban centers.  
 
Today, there are certain intrinsic stadium characteristics that must be achieved in order to 
create a venue that can be constructed and operated effectively. The stadium must be 
planned at a scale that can be absorbed by the sports entertainment market. In other 
words, size matters. If a stadium is too big it will be wasteful and will not operate 
efficiently. If it is too small ticket prices will be astronomical and there will be public 
discord. 
 
Along these same lines, the team owners must be able to achieve revenues that justify 
development. They must be able to attract profitable vendors that can add amenities to 
the venue while providing revenue streams for the franchise. 
 
Some stadium characteristics that were once considered luxuries are now considered 
intrinsic needs. Today, every stadium must have a state of the art audio and video system 
for announcements and replays. This entertainment requirement has spread to encompass 
the need to effectuate a vibrant environment inside and outside of a venue. Cheerleaders, 
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vendors, mascots, music and other elements all round out the proper setting for an 
enjoyable spectator experience.  
 
The recent renaissance of urban stadiums and arenas was aided by the allocation of public 
funding for stadium development. Many justified this method of stadium financing with 
the notion that urban stadiums can as a catalytic tool to revitalize their surroundings. As a 
result the actual net benefits of urban stadium development have been widely debated. 
Still, there can be no question that, given the proper circumstances and public support, 
stadium development can achieve significant benefits. That is not to say that every 
stadium development will prove successful or that every stadium project will provide 
benefits proportionate to public investment. However, if implemented properly, catalytic 
stadium plans can succeed. The Verizon Center in Washington, DC provides an example 
of such success. There were four central ingredients to the success of the Verizon Center 
that are key for any stadium development aimed at effectuating urban renewal: location, 
timing, government programs and complimentary projects. 
 
LOCATION 
The location of the Verizon Center was the initial factor that created the possibility for 
significant urban renewal. The Verizon Center was constructed at the east end of an 
underdeveloped section of the city between the White House and the U.S Capitol. The 
simple fact that this area had been targeted for revitalization for many years prior to the 
development of the Verizon Center provided a fertile environment to achieve great 
market change. In order for any stadium to spark broad urban renewal it must be located 
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in an area that needs and desires improvement. The city government had focused on this 
area for decades without success. Accordingly, the government was ready to act and the 
Verizon Center provided the needed catalyst. 
 
Other physical features made this location viable. It was important that the arena had 
relatively easy access to major roads that connected to the surrounding suburbs. The 
presence of a Metro Rail station was also a key element. Proximity to public 
transportation is central to any urban stadium development. It provides a key means of 
transportation to the area, which bypasses the common gridlock of the Downtown streets. 
The metro is also an asset to the array of real estate development projects that followed. 
Worker access to Downtown is greatly facilitated by the presence of metro stations. 
Proximity to a major metro station is effectively an intrinsic need for all stadiums in the 
21st century. 
 
Another aspect of the location of the Verizon Center that made it successful was the lack 
of any real life or businesses in the area prior to construction. The area was virtually void 
of full time residents removing any battles over displacement. Likewise, the area had few 
businesses other than undesired shops peddling alcohol and pornography. This 
combination of factors allowed redevelopment to occur without any great injustice to its 
neighbors.  
 
Finally proximity to other attractions played a role in the success of the location. The 
market sits between the two most identifiable structures in Washington: the White House 
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and the U.S. Capitol. While these buildings may not directly compliment the arena they 
gave it a sense of place. Furthermore, the area surrounding the arena was filled with 
historic buildings that were waiting to be renovated and reactivated. The arena’s 
development led to this redevelopment, creating a greater market dynamic. 
 
TIMING 
The Verizon Center was approved for development in 1994. At this time the economy 
was recovering from a recent recession and was beginning to rebound. This timing would 
prove significant. The seven years following the announcement of the Verizon Center 
were a period of strong economic growth, allowing for vast real estate development. 
There is no question that the economic backdrop of the mid to late 1990s provided a 
friendly environment for urban renewal and growth. A stable economic environment is 
another, almost intrinsic, requirement for stadium development. 
 
It must be noted that the revitalizing development occurred in a flood as a result of the 
introduction of the Verizon Center. According to Gerry Widicombe, Director of 
Economic Development at the Downtown DC BID, “the Verizon Center accelerated 
development in the area by four to seven years.”108 Developers such as Robert Carr and 
Tom Wilbur, who have accounted for millions of square feet of development in the area, 
agree that the Verizon Center “accelerated” development in the area. They also 
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acknowledge that without the Verizon Center the market may have evolved over a longer 
period of time into something far different such as single use office market.109  
 
Thus, the Verizon Center acted to spark a wave of development that occurred largely 
before the economic slowdown of 2001. Without this four to seven year acceleration, the 
redevelopment may have been stalled by the events of 2001; the economic slowdown and 
the concurrent hesitation to develop in the areas directly surrounding National landmarks 
in Downtown DC. Indeed, the acceleration provided by the development of the Verizon 
Center was the key catalytic event leading to dynamic mixed-use development and 
revitalization of the area. As with most things, good timing can mean the difference 
between success and failure. Good timing is essential for urban stadium development to 
spark renewal. 
 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
The Verizon Center was a key catalyst for a renewed focus on the East End. However, 
the programs that the City of Washington enacted following the announcement of the 
arena played a central role in the revitalization that would follow. These programs ranged 
from financing incentives for the arena, to zoning density bonuses for residential 
development and financing incentives for local developers. 
 
One important attribute of the development of the Verizon Center was that it was 
primarily privately funded. As a result, there were limited debates regarding the city’s 
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contribution of funds. The city did, however, inject important capital into neighborhood 
revitalization in the form of infrastructure improvements and a retail TIF program, among 
others. The Federal Government and the City of Washington implemented a number of 
policies and programs that assisted the revitalization of the area. This participation played 
a key role in encouraging investment in the area over a mix of uses ranging from live 
theater to high-end office. 
 
Government participation is central to the success of urban stadium development and 
derivative urban renewal. The initial challenge is the financing of the construction of the 
venue, but just as important is the government’s role in the implementation of balanced 
policies aimed directly at real estate and market renewal. These policies require the 
cooperation of team owners and local developers and thus must be crafted with great 
care. 
 
COMPLIMENTARY PROJECTS 
The result of properly implemented government policies and incentives is the actual 
development that makes up the revitalization of the area surrounding the arena. The sum 
of these projects equal the success or failure of any revitalization efforts. Broad market 
revitalization cannot be achieved by a single watershed development. The catalytic 
development must be complimented by the projects it leads to. 
 
The Verizon Center paved the way for the development of neighboring Gallery Place. 
Gallery Place, in turn, complimented and magnified the draw of the Verizon Center with 
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its modern movie theater and dynamic mixed-use format. The Verizon Center led to an 
environment where DC residents now felt safe enough in the East End to hop on the 
metro to Gallery Place to take in a movie. This creation of place led to further 
development in the area and, ultimately, a neighborhood that is not only safe, it is vibrant. 
 
The combination of the Verizon Center, Gallery Place and a host of complimentary 
venues such as the Shakespeare Theater and the National Portrait Gallery led to the re-
establishment of Washington, DC’s central market. The Verizon Center provided the 
spark that ignited the revitalization of Downtown DC. 
 
“Verizon Center has been an incredible catalyst for dynamic, urban revitalization in the 
District of Columbia,” said Adrian M. Fenty, Mayor of Washington, D.C.  “It has become 
the heartbeat that has pumped life into downtown Washington and brought a renewed 
sense of pride about everything our great city has to offer.”110 Indeed, the Verizon Center 
played a central role in the revitalization that has occurred in Downtown Washington, 
DC. Described by many as the closest thing to New York City in Washington, the area 
has been totally transformed over the past decade. Yet the Verizon Center alone did not 
effectuate these changes. It simply provided the critical momentum to follow through on 
long sought goals for Downtown reactivation. 
 
Downtown Washington, DC would have been developed at some point and over some 
period of time. That is not in question. The question is, given the history of the area, how 
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long would it have taken to come about and with what result? Without a series of 
catalytic events, the East End most likely would have become another monotone office 
district with little life after 7pm. Instead, the economic rebirth following the 1991 
recession, the city’s desire to create a “living downtown,” the interest of local developers, 
the announcement of the development of the Verizon Center, and the pro growth city 
programs that followed, combined to achieve an accelerated revitalization of the area. 
Thus, the Verizon Center provides a successful example of stadium development acting 
as a catalyst for urban renewal and revitalization. 
  
“‘When Irene and I opened the doors to Verizon Center ten years ago, our goals were to 
provide a world-class sports and entertainment facility in the heart of the nation’s capital, 
and provide a catalyst for the revitalization of downtown Washington, D.C. ,’ says Abe 
Pollin, Chairman of Washington Sports & Entertainment.  ‘On our tenth anniversary, we 
can look back and say that we have accomplished both of those goals.  Now not only is 
the building filled with people attending events, but the entire area has become a vibrant 
economic center.  We’re proud of what we’ve accomplished and we’re excited about 
continuing to bring the best in sports and entertainment to this city for many years to 
come.’”111 
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Source: Downtown DC BID 
Annual Development Within Seven Blocks of the Verizon Center (1995 to 2007) Page 2
(updated 11/21/07 rw)
Invstmnt Constr- No. of No. of No. of No. of 
Project Ld&Cnst uction  Apts/ Hotel Theatr Movie Parkin
 Project/Site                       Project Address  Status (MM's) Type Total Office Resdnl Retail Ent Arts Hotel Other Condos Rooms Seats Scrns Space
2005 $470 1849 254 1223 77 0 66 212 23 1088 383 265 0 2184
The Lafayette Condos 7th & D Sts (Sq 457) Completed part of abovepart of abovepart of abovepart of abovepart of abovepart of apart of abovepart of abovepart of abovepart of above171 part of abovepart of abovepart of apart of a
The Clara Barton at Penn Quarter 7th & D Sts (Sq 457) Completed $120 New&GR 616 0 540 40 0 36 0 0 253 0 0 0 450
Embassy Suites 1001 New York AvenueCompleted $95 New 215 0 0 3 0 0 212 0 0 383 0 0 165
400 Massachusetts Avenue 4th & Massachusetts AveCompleted $60 New 276 0 259 17 0 0 0 0 257 0 0 0 220
Gallery Place--Residential 7th & H Streets Completed $50 Dem&New 215 0 215 0 0 0 0 0 192 0 0 0 0
The Portrait Building 755 8th Street Completed $45 Dem&New 170 144 0 3 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 101
Washington Gas SWC of 11th & H Sts Completed $25 GR/New 115 110 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
1150 K Street Condos 1150 K Street Completed $35 New 126 0 123 3 0 0 0 0 139 0 0 0 92
The Cosmopolitan Condominium 715 6th Street Completed $17 New 46 0 46 6 0 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 12
6th Street Flats 809 6th Street Completed $10 New 40 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 12
Woolly Mammoth Theatre 7th and D Streets Completed $8 New 30 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 265 0 12
Old Convention Center Parking Lot Completed $5 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,100
2006 $705 1462 693 291 101 0 152 0 220 297 0 0 0 666
Natl Portrait Gallery / American Art MuseumBwtn 8/9 and F/G Sts Completed $283 GR&New 382 0 0 10 0 152 0 220 0 0 0 0 0
1101 K Street 1101 K Street Completed $122 New 311 295 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 171
Atlantic Building 920 - 932 F Street Completed $120 Fcd/Dem/New281 240 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 188
Artisan Condos 915 E Street Completed $63 Fcd&New 138 0 131 7 0 0 0 0 160 0 0 0 110
Carroll Square 975 F Street Completed $50 New/Pres 178 158 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 103
Ventana Condos 912 F Street Completed $37 Nw&Rehab 92 0 80 12 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 9
The Sonata 301 Massachusetts AveCompleted $30 New 80 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 85
2007 * $1,111 2755 1702 879 48 0 98 0 28 855 0 1024 0 1754
1101 New York Ave 1101 New York Ave Completed $160 New 390 385 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 215
505 9th Street 505 9th Street Under Construction $135 New 326 307 0 6 0 13 0 0 0 0 248 0 225
Liberty Square 450 5th Street Completed $110 GR 460 460 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
455 Mass Office 455 Massachusetts Under Construction $110 New 242 229 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 219
Madrigal Lofts 811 Fourth Street Under Construction $100 New 259 0 259 0 0 0 0 0 259 0 0 0 250
Sidney Harman Hall 620 F Street Completed $86 New 110 20 0 5 0 85 0 0 0 0 776 0 200
1010 Massachusettes 1010 Massachusettes Completed $76 Dem&New 185 0 176 9 0 0 0 0 163 0 0 0 169
777 6th Street 777 6th Street Completed $75 New 191 181 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150
Reynolds Center Courtyard Btwm 8/9 and F/G Sts Completed $63 New 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0
Bricklayers Office Bldg SWC of 6th & F Sts Completed $61 New 120 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Newseum Residences 555-A Pennsylvania AveCompleted $54 New 146 0 146 0 0 0 0 0 135 0 0 0 80
City Vista- L Condos 5th & K Sts Completed $41 New 149 0 149 0 0 0 0 0 149 0 0 0 121
Yale Steam Laundry Lofts New York Ave (b/w 4th and 5th)U er Construction $40 New/GR 149 0 149 0 0 0 0 0 149 0 0 0 125
2008* $1,025 2749 686 1498 204 0 310 0 197 1368 0 741 0 1923
The Newseum 6th & Pennsylvania Under Construction $381 New 497 50 146 30 0 250 0 167 0 0 0 0 112
City Vista- K Condos, V Apts K St between 4th/5th StsUnder Construction $179 New 652 0 536 116 0 0 0 0 536 0 0 0 661
DuMont East & West 425 Massachusetts Under Construction $115 New 559 0 559 0 0 0 0 0 559 0 0 0 562
1099 New York Ave 1099 New York Ave Under Construction $80 Dem&New 175 167 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 125
1199 F Street 1199 F Street Under Construction $75 Dem&New 250 216 0 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 165
Yale Steam Laundry Phase II New York Ave (b/w 4th and 5th)Planned $40 New/GR 210 0 210 0 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 125
1050 K Street 1050 K Street Under Construction $40 New 136 126 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90
Ford's Theatre Renovation 511 10th Street Under Construction $40 GR 60 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 741 0 0
250 H Street (AIPAC) 250 H Street Under Construction $35 New 90 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Blagden Alley 917 M St & 1212 9th StUnder Construction $23 New 50 0 47 3 0 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 33
1331 G Street 1331 G Street Under Construction $12 Renov 40 37 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mt Vernon Church Renovation 900 Massachusetts AveUnder Construction $5 Renov 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0
2009* $424 958 646 165 112 0 0 0 35 186 0 0 0 590
901 K Street Office (Mt Vernon Church- Office)901 K St Under Construction $130 New 250 208 0 7 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 0 220
700 6th Street 700 6th Street Under Construction $100 New 303 296 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150
Gallery Square 7th & H Streets Planned $110 New 185 65 40 80 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 100
1000 F Street 1000 F Street Planned $32 New 80 77 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60
Eye Lofts 459-433 Eye St Planned $52 New 140 0 125 15 0 0 0 0 164 0 0 0 60
After 2009* $2,926 6811 2405 1311 430 0 0 640 1610 1292 1450 0 0 3500
Old Convention Center Site 900 9th Street Planned $1,000 Dem/New 2,481 415 686 280 0 0 0 985 686 0 0 0 1700
Convention Center Hotel 9th /10th/Mass Ave Planned $555 New 800 0 0 40 0 0 640 160 0 1150 0 0 200
300 K Street 300 K Street Planned $198 New 480 450 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300
K Street Promenade 400 K Street Planned $198 New 450 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300
Martin Luther King Jr. Library 901 G Street Planned $160 GR 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 0 0 0 0 0
600 Mass Ave 600 Mass Ave Planned $150 New 370 350 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300
Mt. Vernon Place Residential (Cantata)3rd & H Streets Planned $140 New 350 0 350 0 0 0 0 0 351 0 0 0 350
Metro Headquarters Redevelopment600 5th Street Planned $120 Renov 400 380 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Old Post Office 1100 Pennsylvania AvePlanned $100 AdaptReuse300 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 300 NA 0 NA
National Law Enforcement Memorial Museum400 Block of E Street Planned $80 New 100 30 0 5 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0
First Congregational Church 945 G Street Planned $76 Dem/New 210 170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140
AV Ristorante Site 601-605 New York AvePlanned $50 Dem&New 165 0 160 5 0 0 0 0 165 0 0 0 160
Penn Tower 724 3rd Street Planned $45 New 115 0 115 0 0 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 50
Gallery Square 7th & H Street Planned $34 New/GR 60 30 na 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canterbury Site 3rd & G Streets Planned $20 New/Pres 130 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Total Investment 1998-December 31, 2007$4,816
Total Investment 1998-2009$6,265
* Projected Deliveries
Rentable/Usable Square Footage (in thousands)
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Source: Downtown DC BID 
Annual Development Within Seven Blocks of the Verizon Center Prepared by the Dowtown Business Improvement District (11/21/07 
21-Nov-07
Total Live Museums: Restaur-
Invest- Hotels: Movie Theatre Number/ ants
ment Office Retail Number/ Apart- Screens/ Stages/ Square Opened/
(land& Space Space Rooms ments Condos Seats Seats Footage Cumula-
const) Built Built Built Built Built Built Built Built tive
1995 178$            705           SF 84             SF -         Rooms -            Apts -         Condos -          -         -          0
0
1996 59$               258           3              -         -            -         -          -         -          0
0
1997 53$               225           12             -         -            -         -          -         -          3
3
Opening in December 1997
1998 -$             -             -            -         -            -         -          -         -          4
7
1999 193$            656           18             -         86             -         -          -         -          5
12
2000 340$            1,063         44             1             -            -         -          -         -          6
188         18
2001 242$            869           132          -         -            -         -          -         -          5
23
2002 444$            1,238         63             1             58             -         -          -         1              9
184         40             32
2003  (2003 does not include 485$            1,792         33             -         665          79          -          -         1              7
 new convention center) 45             39
2004 826$            1,524         411          -         759          -         22             -          3
3,600        42
2005 470$            254           70             1             -            1,088     -          1             -          3
383         265        45
2006 705$            693           101          -         -            297        -          -         1              0
382          45
2007 1,111$           1,702         48             -         135          720        -          1             1              9
776        25             54
Sub-Total for 1998 - 12/31/2007 4,816$         9,791         SF 920          SF 755         Rooms 1,703        Apts 2,184     Condos 3,600        1,041     492          54               
2008* Projection 1,025$         686           204          -         -            1,368     -          1             1              5
248        497          55
2009** Projection 424$            646           112          -         165          22          -          -         -          5
60
Total 1998 through 2009 6,265$         11,123        SF 1,236        SF 755         Rooms 1,868        Apts 3,574     Condos 3,600        1,290     989          60
*   100% of projects are currently under construction.
**  Projects are mostly planned, with one or two already under construction.
Development By Type (dollar numbers in millions, and built space numbers in thousands of square feet)
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Appendix 4 
 
 
Source: Downtown DC BID 
Annual Incremental Tax Revenues Generated By Development Within Seven Blocks of the Verizon CenterPrepared by the Dowtown Business Improvement District (11/21/07 
21-Nov-07
Live Restaur-
Total Office Retail Hotels Apt Condos Movie Theater Museums ant
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
1995 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1997 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Opening in December 1997 
1998 900$             -            -           -         -           -         -           -         -           900$           
1999 9,249           7,035$       370$         -         663$         -         -           -         -           1,181           
2000 15,365         12,156$     952$         772$       -           -         -           -         -           1,485           
2001 14,937         10,642$     3,002$      -         -           -         -           -         -           1,294           
2002 19,592         14,101$     1,502$      742         467$         -         -           -         350           2,430           
2003 35,360         26,382$     823           -         5,436$      695        -           -         54            1,969           
2004 43,341         24,458       10,636     -         6,292        -         1,077       -         -           878             
2005 19,441         4,541         1,901        1,888       -           10,095    -           104        -           911             
2006 18,186         12,378       2,848        -         -           2,779     -           -         180           -               
2007 43,623         30,400       1,354        -         1,139        6,738     -           305        852           2,835           
Sub-Total for 1998 - 12/31/07 219,994$      142,092$   23,388$   3,402$     13,998$     20,308$  1,077$     409$      1,436$     13,883$      
2007* Projection 34,734         12,253       5,753        -         -           12,802    -           98           2,254       1,575           
2008** Projection 17,870         11,538        3,158        -         1,392        206        -           -         -           1,575           
Total 1998 through 2009 272,598$      165,883$   32,300$   3,402$     15,390$     33,316$  1,077$     507$      3,690$     17,033$      
ANNUAL TAXES GENERATED $259,445 $174,881 $25,944 $3,877 $14,371 $20,439 $1,077 $409 $1,436 $17,010
Based on development through 2007
Taxes Generated by the Projects Completed in Each Year Based On Each Year's Delivered/Completed Projects
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Source: Downtown DC BID 
Jobs Generated By Development Within Seven Blocks of the Verizon Center Prepared by the Dowtown Business Improvement District (11/21/
21-Nov-07
Live Restaur-
Total Office Retail Hotel Apt Condos Movie Theater Museums ant
Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs Jobs
1995 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1996 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1997 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Opening in December 1997 
1998 160              -            -           -          -           -          -          -          -          160              
1999 2,481           2,187          90            -          4              -          -          -          -          200              
2000 4,191           3,543          220          188          -           -          -          -          -          240              
2001 3,757           2,897          660          -          -           -          -          -          200              
2002 5,069           4,127          315          184          3              -          -          80            360              
2003 6,476           5,973          165          -          33            4            -          -          20            280              
2004 7,377           5,080          2,055       -          38            -          84            -          -          120              
2005 1,774           847           350          383          -           54          20          -          120              
2006 2,930           2,310          505          -          -           15          -          100          -              
2007 6,386           5,673          240          -          7              36          40          30            360              
Sub-Total for 1998 - 12/31/07 40,600          32,637       4,600       755          85            109        84            60          230          2,040          
2008 Projection 3,725           2,287          1,020       -          -           68          -          -          150          200              
2009 Projection 2,923           2,153          560          -          8              1            -          -          -          200              
Total 1998 through 2009 47,248          37,077       6,180       755          93            179        84            60          380          2,440          
Jobs Generated Based On Each Year's Delivered/Completed Projects 
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